révision scientifique complète (editorial board, 2026-10-17)
v1.0 -> v1.1 : conclusions reformulées en bornes (élagage 1/99 vs règle IAAO 1,5 x IQR), exposition formelle du biais d'atténuation (bornes Kochin-Parks, 1re étape Clapp), spline par quintile de prix, transfert fiscal sous 3 tris x 2 référentiels, PRB intra-municipale par décalage/année, grandes villes, cadre LFM vérifié, 51 références toutes vérifiées (DOI), script 06 + 8 tables, appendix A, docs/REVIEW-REPORT.md + docs/CHANGELOG-REVISION.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
44 changed files +2,951 −900
modified
README.md
+84 −43
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ | |||||
| 4 | **UQO Working Paper No. 10** — *Vertical and Horizontal Inequity in Municipal | 4 | **UQO Working Paper No. 10** — *Vertical and Horizontal Inequity in Municipal | ||
| 5 | Property Valuation: Evidence from 522,769 Sales Matched to the Assessment Roll* | 5 | Property Valuation: Evidence from 522,769 Sales Matched to the Assessment Roll* | ||
| 6 | 6 | ||||
| 7 | −[-b31b1b?logo=latex&logoColor=white)](paper/main.pdf) | 7 | +[-b31b1b?logo=latex&logoColor=white)](paper/main.pdf) | ||
| 8 | [](requirements.txt) | 8 | [](requirements.txt) | ||
| 9 | [](data/raw/README.md) | 9 | [](data/raw/README.md) | ||
| 10 | [-4051b5)](src/wp10/models.py) | 10 | [-4051b5)](src/wp10/models.py) | ||
@@ -14,14 +14,20 @@ Property Valuation: Evidence from 522,769 Sales Matched to the Assessment Roll* | |||||
| 14 | [](mailto:simon-pierre.boucher@uqo.ca) | 14 | [](mailto:simon-pierre.boucher@uqo.ca) | ||
| 15 | 15 | ||||
| 16 | > **TL;DR** — Matching 522,769 Quebec residential sales (2021–2026) to the triennial | 16 | > **TL;DR** — Matching 522,769 Quebec residential sales (2021–2026) to the triennial | ||
| 17 | −> assessment rolls that tax them, this paper delivers the **first province-wide audit | 17 | +> assessment rolls that tax them, this paper delivers the first province-wide ratio | ||
| 18 | −> of property-assessment equity in Canada**. Within the same municipality × roll × | 18 | +> study of assessment equity for a Canadian province. Its central finding is that the | ||
| 19 | −> year, the elasticity of the assessment ratio w.r.t. price is **−0.34** (Cheng FE) | 19 | +> measured regressivity hinges on the treatment of extreme assessment ratios. Under a | ||
| 20 | −> and still **−0.08** under Clapp's measurement-error-robust IV. **99% of | 20 | +> lenient 1/99 trim the within-market elasticity of the assessment ratio w.r.t. price is | ||
| 21 | −> municipalities** fail the IAAO uniformity standard, **95%** fail its vertical-equity | 21 | +> **−0.34** (Cheng FE) and **−0.08** under Clapp's rank IV, and 95% of municipalities fail | ||
| 22 | −> standard — Montréal is the lone progressive large market. The median dwelling in the | 22 | +> the IAAO vertical-equity band. Under the **IAAO outlier rule** (1.5 × IQR within cell, | ||
| 23 | −> bottom local price decile pays **~65% more property tax** than uniform assessment | 23 | +> 9% of sales, 53% of the bottom price decile) the elasticity is **−0.09** (IV: −0.01, | ||
| 24 | −> would imply; the top decile pays ~5% less. | 24 | +> n.s.), the province-wide PRB is +0.02, the COD is 17, the ten largest cities post CODs | ||
| 25 | +> of 9–12 and three quarters of municipalities comply. Proportionality holds across the | ||||
| 26 | +> upper 80% of each market's price distribution under either treatment. Invariant to the | ||||
| 27 | +> rule: condos are assessed proportionally, single-family/plex/old/land-heavy/small-market | ||||
| 28 | +> dwellings are (mildly) regressive, and within-municipality PRB widened in 2021–2022. | ||||
| 29 | +> The bottom decile overpays **6–65%** depending on the treatment; the top decile | ||||
| 30 | +> underpays 3–5%. | ||||
| 25 | 31 | ||||
| 26 | --- | 32 | --- | ||
| 27 | 33 | ||||
@@ -29,9 +35,9 @@ Property Valuation: Evidence from 522,769 Sales Matched to the Assessment Roll* | |||||
| 29 | 35 | ||||
| 30 | | Item | Value | | 36 | | Item | Value | | ||
| 31 | |---|---| | 37 | |---|---| | ||
| 32 | −| Version | 1.0 (August 2026) | | 38 | +| Version | 1.1 (October 2026) — revised 2026-10-17 by the editorial-board review (see `docs/`) | | ||
| 33 | | SSRN | not yet submitted | | 39 | | SSRN | not yet submitted | | ||
| 34 | −| Journal | not yet submitted | | 40 | +| Journal | not yet submitted — target *Regional Science and Urban Economics* (fallback *National Tax Journal*); anonymous PDF in `Recherche-UQO/_soumissions/revues/assessment-gap-quebec/` | | ||
| 35 | | Code & data | reproducible from `scripts/` (see Quick start); raw parquet snapshot not redistributed | | 41 | | Code & data | reproducible from `scripts/` (see Quick start); raw parquet snapshot not redistributed | | ||
| 36 | 42 | ||||
| 37 | ## 📖 Table of contents | 43 | ## 📖 Table of contents | ||
@@ -69,25 +75,36 @@ ln AV_i = α_c(i) + β · ln SP_i + ε_i (c = municipality × roll × sale- | |||||
| 69 | ratio studies toward spurious regressivity; | 75 | ratio studies toward spurious regressivity; | ||
| 70 | - the full **IAAO ratio-study battery** (median ratio, COD, PRD, PRB) with | 76 | - the full **IAAO ratio-study battery** (median ratio, COD, PRD, PRB) with | ||
| 71 | bootstrap CIs is computed for every municipality with ≥ 100 usable sales; | 77 | bootstrap CIs is computed for every municipality with ≥ 100 usable sales; | ||
| 72 | −- quantile profiles, subgroup elasticities, horizontal-dispersion regressions and | 78 | +- the **Kochin–Parks reverse-regression bound** and the Clapp first stage make the | ||
| 73 | − an exact **intra-municipal tax-shift** calculation complete the audit. | 79 | + measurement-error problem explicit (Appendix A); | ||
| 80 | +- every statistic is re-computed under **five outlier-trimming rules** (baseline 1/99 | ||||
| 81 | + by vintage, 3 × IQR, 1.5 × IQR = IAAO Appendix B, 2.5/97.5 and 5/95 within cell); | ||||
| 82 | +- piecewise-linear and quantile profiles, subgroup elasticities (baseline and trimmed), | ||||
| 83 | + horizontal-dispersion regressions and an **intra-municipal tax-shift** calculation | ||||
| 84 | + under three sorting variables and two benchmarks complete the audit. | ||||
| 74 | 85 | ||||
| 75 | ## 🏆 Headline results | 86 | ## 🏆 Headline results | ||
| 76 | 87 | ||||
| 77 | −| Object | Estimate | | 88 | +| Object | Baseline (1/99 trim by vintage) | IAAO-trimmed (1.5 × IQR within cell) | | ||
| 78 | −|---|---| | 89 | +|---|---|---| | ||
| 79 | −| Cheng elasticity, pooled OLS | β = 0.812 (0.029) | | 90 | +| Sales | 522,769 | 471,148 (9.2% dropped; 53% of bottom price decile) | | ||
| 80 | −| Cheng elasticity, cell FE | **β = 0.656 (0.029)** → γ = −0.344 | | 91 | +| Cheng elasticity, cell FE: γ = β − 1 | **−0.344 (0.029)** | **−0.088 (0.013)** | | ||
| 81 | −| Clapp rank-IV (error-robust) | **β = 0.917 (0.021)** → γ = −0.083 | | 92 | +| Clapp rank-IV γ | **−0.083 (0.021)** | **−0.013 (0.009)**, n.s. | | ||
| 82 | −| Quantile profile β(τ), τ = .10 → .90 | 0.87 → **0.49** (failure concentrated at the top) | | 93 | +| Kochin–Parks bracket [β_F, 1/β_R] | [0.656, 1.137] — contains 1 | — | | ||
| 83 | −| Province-wide PRB (2021 / 2024) | −0.104 / −0.002 (staleness mechanism) | | 94 | +| Province-wide COD / PRD / PRB | 28.5 / 1.072 / −0.029 | 17.0 / 1.004 / +0.025 | | ||
| 84 | −| Municipalities with PRB < 0 | **99%** (95% below IAAO band) | | 95 | +| Municipalities (≥100 sales): COD > 15 | 99% of 261 | 30% of 241 | | ||
| 85 | −| Median municipality COD | 26 (IAAO ceiling: 15) | | 96 | +| Municipalities: PRB < −0.05 / < −0.10 | 95% / 84% | 24% / 5% | | ||
| 86 | −| Excess tax, bottom ↔ top local decile | **+65% ↔ −5%** (median) | | 97 | +| Piecewise β by within-market price quintile (Q1 … Q5) | 0.07, 0.89, 0.71, 1.00, 0.95 | Q1 0.87, Q5 0.95 | | ||
| 87 | −| The exception | Montréal: PRB **+0.07**, progressive in all 6 years | | 98 | +| Quantile β(τ), τ = .10 → .90 (conditional ln AV) | 0.87 → 0.49 | — | | ||
| 88 | − | 99 | +| Ten largest cities: COD / PRB | 16.9–30.5 / −0.39 to +0.07 | 9.2–12.3 / −0.056 to +0.027 | | ||
| 89 | −Sub-group anatomy: condos γ = −0.12 vs single-family −0.45 / plex −0.49; | 100 | +| Within-municipality median PRB, 2021–22 vs 2024–26 | ≈ −0.2 every year (no gradient) | −0.04 vs ≈ 0 | | ||
| 90 | −land share > 0.4 → −0.50; age > 60 y → −0.43; large markets (>10k sales) −0.27. | 101 | +| Excess tax, bottom ↔ top decile (sorted on price, median) | **+65% ↔ −5%** | **+6.6% ↔ −3.2%** | | ||
| 102 | +| Excess tax, sorted on IAAO blended proxy | +5.6% ↔ −0.2% | — | | ||||
| 103 | + | ||||
| 104 | +Sub-group anatomy (baseline → trimmed γ_FE): condos −0.12 → 0.00; single-family −0.45 → | ||||
| 105 | +−0.12; plex −0.49 → −0.12; land share > 0.4: −0.50 → −0.14; age > 60 y: −0.43 → −0.14; | ||||
| 106 | +munis > 10k sales (8 clusters): −0.27 → −0.05. Montréal is the least regressive large | ||||
| 107 | +city (γ_FE −0.18 → −0.03), not an exception. | ||||
| 91 | 108 | ||||
| 92 | ## 🗂 Repository layout | 109 | ## 🗂 Repository layout | ||
| 93 | 110 | ||||
@@ -107,12 +124,14 @@ wp10_uqo/ | |||||
| 107 | │ ├── 02_iaao_stats.py | 124 | │ ├── 02_iaao_stats.py | ||
| 108 | │ ├── 03_estimate_regressions.py | 125 | │ ├── 03_estimate_regressions.py | ||
| 109 | │ ├── 04_make_figures.py | 126 | │ ├── 04_make_figures.py | ||
| 110 | −│ └── 05_make_tables.py | 127 | +│ ├── 05_make_tables.py | ||
| 128 | +│ └── 06_revision_analyses.py # bounds, trimming grid, spline, alt. tax shift (2026-10-17) | ||||
| 111 | ├── results/ | 129 | ├── results/ | ||
| 112 | −│ ├── reproduced/ # every CSV the scripts emit | 130 | +│ ├── reproduced/ # every CSV the scripts emit (rev_*.csv from step 06) | ||
| 113 | −│ └── tables/ # LaTeX tables input by the paper | 131 | +│ └── tables/ # 18 LaTeX tables input by the paper | ||
| 114 | ├── figures/ # 10 publication figures (PNG, 300 dpi) | 132 | ├── figures/ # 10 publication figures (PNG, 300 dpi) | ||
| 115 | −└── paper/ # main.tex + sections/ + references.bib → main.pdf | 133 | +├── docs/ # REVIEW-REPORT.md, CHANGELOG-REVISION.md, pre-revision PDF | ||
| 134 | +└── paper/ # main.tex + sections/ + appendix/ + references.bib → main.pdf | ||||
| 116 | ``` | 135 | ``` | ||
| 117 | 136 | ||||
| 118 | ## 🚀 Quick start | 137 | ## 🚀 Quick start | ||
@@ -126,12 +145,13 @@ python3 scripts/01_build_sample.py # 745,119 → 522,769 sales | |||||
| 126 | python3 scripts/02_iaao_stats.py # IAAO diagnostics + bootstrap | 145 | python3 scripts/02_iaao_stats.py # IAAO diagnostics + bootstrap | ||
| 127 | python3 scripts/03_estimate_regressions.py # FE / IV / quantile / heterogeneity / tax shift | 146 | python3 scripts/03_estimate_regressions.py # FE / IV / quantile / heterogeneity / tax shift | ||
| 128 | python3 scripts/04_make_figures.py # 10 figures | 147 | python3 scripts/04_make_figures.py # 10 figures | ||
| 129 | −python3 scripts/05_make_tables.py # 10 LaTeX tables | 148 | +python3 scripts/06_revision_analyses.py # bounds, trimming grid, spline, tax-shift variants (~40 s) | ||
| 149 | +python3 scripts/05_make_tables.py # 18 LaTeX tables | ||||
| 130 | 150 | ||||
| 131 | cd paper && make # compile main.pdf (latexmk) | 151 | cd paper && make # compile main.pdf (latexmk) | ||
| 132 | ``` | 152 | ``` | ||
| 133 | 153 | ||||
| 134 | −Total runtime ≈ 5 minutes on an Apple-silicon laptop; peak RAM ≈ 6 GB. | 154 | +Total runtime ≈ 6 minutes on an Apple-silicon laptop; peak RAM ≈ 6 GB. | ||
| 135 | 155 | ||||
| 136 | ## 🗃 Data | 156 | ## 🗃 Data | ||
| 137 | 157 | ||||
@@ -157,8 +177,13 @@ valid AV/SP → 1/99% ratio trim within roll vintage → cells ≥ 20 sales | |||||
| 157 | 5. **Heterogeneity**: separate FE estimates by class, age, land share, roll lag, | 177 | 5. **Heterogeneity**: separate FE estimates by class, age, land share, roll lag, | ||
| 158 | municipality size, sale year. | 178 | municipality size, sale year. | ||
| 159 | 6. **Horizontal inequity**: |ln r − cell median| regressed on characteristics. | 179 | 6. **Horizontal inequity**: |ln r − cell median| regressed on characteristics. | ||
| 160 | −7. **Tax shift**: r / cell-median − 1 by within-cell price decile — exact % | 180 | +7. **Tax shift**: r / benchmark − 1 by within-cell decile of a sorting variable | ||
| 161 | − over/under-payment under Quebec's exemption-free ad valorem rule. | 181 | + (sale price, IAAO blended proxy, assessed value), cell-median or revenue-neutral | ||
| 182 | + aggregate benchmark — statutory incidence under the residual-category rate. | ||||
| 183 | +8. **Revision analyses** (`scripts/06_revision_analyses.py`): Kochin–Parks reverse | ||||
| 184 | + bound and implied noise shares, Clapp first stage, piecewise-linear (Sunderman) | ||||
| 185 | + profile, five outlier rules × full battery, trimmed heterogeneity and city | ||||
| 186 | + diagnostics, PRB by lag band/year within municipalities, time-adjusted CODs. | ||||
| 162 | 187 | ||||
| 163 | ## 🖼 Figures & tables inventory | 188 | ## 🖼 Figures & tables inventory | ||
| 164 | 189 | ||||
@@ -176,16 +201,23 @@ valid AV/SP → 1/99% ratio trim within roll vintage → cells ≥ 20 sales | |||||
| 176 | 201 | ||||
| 177 | Tables (`results/tables/*.tex`): summary stats, IAAO province-wide, ten largest | 202 | Tables (`results/tables/*.tex`): summary stats, IAAO province-wide, ten largest | ||
| 178 | markets, vertical regressions, quantiles, heterogeneity, horizontal, tax shift, | 203 | markets, vertical regressions, quantiles, heterogeneity, horizontal, tax shift, | ||
| 179 | −robustness, Paglin–Fogarty. | 204 | +robustness, Paglin–Fogarty, plus the revision tables `rev_trim_grid`, `rev_spline`, | ||
| 205 | +`rev_taxshift_alt`, `rev_het_trimmed`, `rev_cities`, `rev_cod`, `rev_prb_blocks`, | ||||
| 206 | +`rev_bounds` (Appendix A). Figures are drawn on the baseline sample; the trimmed | ||||
| 207 | +counterparts are tabulated. | ||||
| 180 | 208 | ||||
| 181 | ## ⚠️ Limitations | 209 | ## ⚠️ Limitations | ||
| 182 | 210 | ||||
| 183 | −- Sales < $50k absent from the source registry; residual non-arm's-length | 211 | +- **No arm's-length flag** in Quebec transaction records: 9% of sales have ratios the | ||
| 184 | − transfers may survive screens (bottom-decile shift = upper bound). | 212 | + IAAO rule classifies as outliers, concentrated in the bottom price decile; whether | ||
| 185 | −- 2021–2026 is an unusually turbulent market — levels statistics are | 213 | + they are over-assessed dwellings or nominal transfers cannot be settled, so results | ||
| 186 | − period-specific (the within-market elasticity is not). | 214 | + are reported as bounds (baseline = upper bound, IAAO-trimmed = lower bound). | ||
| 187 | −- No appeals, renovations, or owner demographics observed. | 215 | +- Sales < $50k absent from the source registry. | ||
| 188 | −- Montréal's progressivity may partly reflect borough-level composition. | 216 | +- 2021–2026 is an unusually turbulent market — level statistics are period-specific. | ||
| 217 | +- No appeals, renovations, owner demographics or phase-in (*étalement*) resolutions | ||||
| 218 | + observed; tax-shift figures are statutory, not economic, incidence. | ||||
| 219 | +- Cluster-robust SEs rest on 8 clusters for the >10k-sales band and on one | ||||
| 220 | + municipality (HC-robust) for the city-level estimates. | ||||
| 189 | 221 | ||||
| 190 | ## 📝 Citation | 222 | ## 📝 Citation | ||
| 191 | 223 | ||||
@@ -199,7 +231,8 @@ robustness, Paglin–Fogarty. | |||||
| 199 | type = {Working Paper}, | 231 | type = {Working Paper}, | ||
| 200 | number = {10}, | 232 | number = {10}, | ||
| 201 | year = {2026}, | 233 | year = {2026}, | ||
| 202 | − month = {August} | 234 | + month = {October}, | ||
| 235 | + note = {Version 1.1} | ||||
| 203 | } | 236 | } | ||
| 204 | ``` | 237 | ``` | ||
| 205 | 238 | ||||
@@ -213,3 +246,11 @@ Université du Québec en Outaouais (UQO), Gatineau, QC. | |||||
| 213 | 246 | ||||
| 214 | - Numbering: UQO Working Paper No. 10. (A June 2026 VQuant methodology paper also carried the label "WP 10"; it is now WP 13.) | 247 | - Numbering: UQO Working Paper No. 10. (A June 2026 VQuant methodology paper also carried the label "WP 10"; it is now WP 13.) | ||
| 215 | - Cover page, metadata and layout follow `Recherche-UQO/HARMONISATION.md` (2026-10-17). | 248 | - Cover page, metadata and layout follow `Recherche-UQO/HARMONISATION.md` (2026-10-17). | ||
| 249 | +- **Scientific revision 2026-10-17 (v1.0 → v1.1):** editorial-board review report in | ||||
| 250 | + `docs/REVIEW-REPORT.md`, audit trail in `docs/CHANGELOG-REVISION.md`; pre-revision | ||||
| 251 | + PDF preserved as `docs/main_pre-revision-20261017.pdf` (git tag `pre-revision-20261017`). | ||||
| 252 | + Headline conclusions changed: regressivity is now reported as bounds that depend on | ||||
| 253 | + the outlier rule; the "Montréal exception" and the "staleness doubles inequity" claims | ||||
| 254 | + of v1.0 were withdrawn after re-analysis. | ||||
| 255 | +- Figures are read by the paper from `figures/` (not `paper/figures/`), a deviation | ||||
| 256 | + from the standard layout kept to avoid duplicating 10 PNG files. | ||||
added
docs/CHANGELOG-REVISION.md
+66 −0
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ | |||||
| 1 | +# WP 10 — Journal d'audit de la révision scientifique (2026-10-17) | ||||
| 2 | + | ||||
| 3 | +État de départ : tag `pre-revision-20261017`, `docs/main_pre-revision-20261017.pdf` (v1.0, 29 p.). État d'arrivée : v1.1, 45 p. | ||||
| 4 | +Aucun fichier original n'a été supprimé ; les anciens résultats (`results/reproduced/*.csv`, tables, figures) sont inchangés ; tous | ||||
| 5 | +les nouveaux chiffres proviennent de `scripts/06_revision_analyses.py` (38 s, laptop Apple silicon) et des tables générées par | ||||
| 6 | +`scripts/05_make_tables.py` (fonctions `t_rev_*`). | ||||
| 7 | + | ||||
| 8 | +## 1. Corrections majeures (où / avant / après / pourquoi / preuve) | ||||
| 9 | + | ||||
| 10 | +| # | Où | Avant (v1.0) | Après (v1.1) | Pourquoi | Preuve | | ||||
| 11 | +|---|---|---|---|---|---| | ||||
| 12 | +| 1 | Abstract, intro, résultats §6.3, conclusion | régressivité « pervasive, large, unambiguous » : γ_FE −0,34, γ_IV −0,08 ; 95 % munis < −0,05 ; 99 % COD > 15 | bornes : base (−0,34 / −0,08 ; 95 % ; 99 %) vs IAAO 1,5 × IQR (−0,088 (0,013) / −0,013 (0,009) n.s. ; 24 % ; 30 %) | règle IAAO annexe B ; 53 % du décile 1 sont des outliers | `rev_trim_grid.csv`, `rev_outlier_by_decile.csv`, Table 5 | | ||||
| 13 | +| 2 | Intro, §6.4 (quantiles) | « failure concentrated at the top… under-assessed at an accelerating rate » | τ = quantile conditionnel de ln AV ; spline : β = 0,07 (Q1), 0,89, 0,71, 1,00, 0,95 → défaillance **en bas** | erreur d'interprétation du quantile | `rev_spline.csv`, Table 6, fig. 6 | | ||||
| 14 | +| 3 | Intro, résultats, discussion, conclusion | « PRB doubles in 2021-22 … direct evidence that infrequent revaluation is a first-order driver » | PRB province = composition ; PRB médiane intra-muni base ≈ −0,2 toutes années ; élagué −0,044/−0,043 → ≈ 0 ; γ plat par bande | décomposition between/within | `rev_prb_blocks*.csv`, `rev_iaao_year_trimmed.csv`, Table 16 | | ||||
| 15 | +| 4 | Intro, §6.1, §6.8, discussion, légendes fig. 4–5 | « Montréal the only progressive large market, in all six years » | γ_FE Montréal −0,18 (base) / −0,03 (élagué), γ_IV +0,03 ; 10 villes élaguées : COD 9,2–12,3, PRB −0,056 à +0,027 ; « least regressive, not an exception » | PRB pondérée par niveaux + 49 % condos | `rev_cities*.csv`, Table 12 | | ||||
| 16 | +| 5 | Abstract, intro, §6.7, conclusion | « bottom decile pays ~65 % more… top ~5 % less » | 6–65 % selon le traitement ; +5,6 % (proxy IAAO) ; +6,6 % (élagué) ; −5,4 % si tri sur AV ; top −3 à −5 % | tri sur prix charge le bruit u dans D1 | `rev_taxshift_alt.csv`, `rev_trim_grid.csv`, Table 11 | | ||||
| 17 | +| 6 | §5.3 Méthodologie, annexe A | pas d'algèbre ; « IV = lower bound, truth lies between » | plim β_F = β(1−λ) ; borne 1/β_R = 1,137 (contient 1) ; bruit requis 0,28 (β = 1) / 0,25 (IV) ; biais vers le haut de l'IV de Clapp (Z dépend de ε) ; Griliches–Hausman | rigueur | `rev_bounds.csv`, Table A.1 | | ||||
| 18 | +| 7 | §5.2, §6.2 | « absorbing the cell FE steepens it » (lu comme plus d'iniquité) | ajout : amplification mécanique de l'atténuation par les EF | Griliches & Hausman 1986 | éq. 7 | | ||||
| 19 | +| 8 | §3 Institutionnel | « between 18 and 54 months elapse » ; « exact mapping… no caps » ; « appeal rates low » ; MAMH « audits rolls » | 98,5 % ≤ 54 mois, max 102 (art. 14.2, 72) ; étalement 253.27 et 253.51 ; révision art. 124 sans statistiques ; art. 264 proportion médiane ; art. 5 MRC ; art. 244.29-30 catégorie résiduelle ; absence de déclaration de pleine concurrence | texte de loi consolidé (LégisQuébec, 17 oct. 2026) | `rev_misc.csv` (share_lag_gt_54 = 0,01454, max_lag = 102) | | ||||
| 20 | +| 9 | §5.1 | COD ≤ 15 pour tout ; PRB ±0,05 seul critère | COD 5–15 (unifamilial ancien), 5–10 (récent), 5–20 (2–4 logements, saisonnier, mobile) ; PRB ±0,05 et IC hors ±0,10 = inacceptable (§9.2.7) ; part < −0,10 ajoutée (84 % → 5 %) | texte IAAO 2013 | PDF IAAO (audits2.ga.gov) | | ||||
| 21 | +| 10 | §6.6 Horizontal | « rises by 0.75 log points per decade » ; « land-heavy … noisy valuations » | 0,75 point de pourcentage ; land share n.s. (+0,003, s.e. 0,030) ; R² = 0,045 | lecture de la table | `horizontal.csv` | | ||||
| 22 | +| 11 | §7 Robustesse | « t-statistics exceed 11 in every variant » ; « moves by less than 0.005 » ; « F far above thresholds » | t > 6 (6,6 pour trim 5/95), 11 en base ; < 0,01 ; F = 2 418, coef 0,509, R² 0,59 | calcul | `robustness.csv`, `rev_bounds.csv` | | ||||
| 23 | +| 12 | §4.2 Données | classes sans les 574 « autres » ; cellules = muni × année implicite | 574 ajoutés ; 85 muni-années à 2 rôles sur 2 798 | vérification | `rev_misc.csv` | | ||||
| 24 | +| 13 | §5.2, tables 7–8 | pas de nombre de clusters | 625 ; 527/66/121/29 ; 540/77/8 ; villes = 1 (HC robuste) | Cameron–Miller | `rev_clusters.csv` | | ||||
| 25 | +| 14 | Littérature | voir §3 ci-dessous | — | — | — | | ||||
| 26 | + | ||||
| 27 | +## 2. Autres corrections éditoriales | ||||
| 28 | + | ||||
| 29 | +- « four times stronger » → gradient donné en chiffres ; « first province-wide evaluation… Canadian » → « first province-wide ratio study for a Canadian province » ; superlatifs retirés (« strikingly », « enormous », « almost embarrassing fidelity », « remarkably »). | ||||
| 30 | +- Listes à puces du §6.5 converties en prose (protocole). | ||||
| 31 | +- Légendes des fig. 1–10 : « baseline sample » précisé ; renvois aux tables élaguées ; fig. 6 : « decline concentrated in the four lowest vigintiles » ; fig. 7 : τ défini. | ||||
| 32 | +- Table 2 (IAAO) notes : normes COD par classe ; Table 4 : 1re étape ; Table 9 : trim 5/95 « pooled ». | ||||
| 33 | +- `\WPversion` 1.0 → 1.1 ; `\WPdate` August 2026 → October 2026 ; mots-clés + « assessment ratio », « measurement error ». | ||||
| 34 | +- Préambule : `url`, `pdflscape`, `placeins` (barrières de flottants) ; `\appendix` + `appendix/appendix.tex`. | ||||
| 35 | +- `main_anon.tex` régénéré à l'identique (titlepage_anon, pdfauthor vide) ; recherche plein texte : Boucher/UQO/Outaouais/spboucher/acknowledg = 0, « Gatineau » = 3 (nom de ville dans les tableaux, légitime). | ||||
| 36 | + | ||||
| 37 | +## 3. Références | ||||
| 38 | + | ||||
| 39 | +**Retirées (6)** : bell1984administrative (introuvable Crossref/Web), mpac2022vertical (introuvable), found2017property (hors sujet), baar1981property | ||||
| 40 | +(sans DOI ; une seule citation secondaire ; non nécessaire), clapp1990methods (non citée), quintos2020prb (titre inexistant). | ||||
| 41 | +**Corrigées (5)** : mcmillen2022allocative → `mcmillen2023measures` (JHE 61, 101950, DOI 10.1016/j.jhe.2023.101950) ; oates2016local pages 415–433 ; | ||||
| 42 | +cheng1974property numéro 3–4 + note RePEc ; avenancio2022assessment DOI 10.1093/qje/qjac009 ; ihlanfeldt2023appraisal → clé `ihlanfeldt2022homestead`. | ||||
| 43 | +**DOI ajoutés** à toutes les entrées existantes indexées (Crossref `api.crossref.org/works?query.bibliographic=…`, 2026-10-17). | ||||
| 44 | +**Ajoutées (17, toutes vérifiées)** : | ||||
| 45 | +cheng1970common 10.1086/ntj41791700 · kochin1984reply 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1984.tb00687.x · klepper1984consistent 10.2307/1911466 · | ||||
| 46 | +griliches1986errors 10.1016/0304-4076(86)90058-8 · koenker1978regression 10.2307/1913643 · cameron2015practitioner 10.3368/jhr.50.2.317 · | ||||
| 47 | +abadie2023clustering 10.1093/qje/qjac038 · birch2014regression 10.1080/10835547.2013.12092083 · birch2017reducing 10.63642/1357-1419.1197 · | ||||
| 48 | +quintos2020gini 10.63642/1357-1419.1225 · cornia2005multifamily 10.1080/10835547.2005.12091152 · mcmillen2013appeals 10.1111/j.1540-6229.2011.00326.x · | ||||
| 49 | +mcmillen2023measures 10.1016/j.jhe.2023.101950 · mcmillen2026homestead 10.1086/740783 · harris2001social 10.1068/a33128 · | ||||
| 50 | +bird2012tale (Lincoln Institute, ISBN 978-1-55844-225-2, page éditeur) · gloudemans2011prb (Fair & Equitable 9(8):3-8, vérifiée par bibliographie secondaire). | ||||
| 51 | +Désormais citées : oates1969effects, oates2016local, slack2014political (déjà au .bib). | ||||
| 52 | +Sources de vérification non-Crossref : RePEc (Cheng 1974) ; lincolninst.edu (McMillen 2011, Bird et al. 2012) ; LégisQuébec (LFM) ; PDF IAAO 2013 (audits2.ga.gov). | ||||
| 53 | + | ||||
| 54 | +## 4. Réanalyses exécutées | ||||
| 55 | + | ||||
| 56 | +| Script | Durée | Sorties | | ||||
| 57 | +|---|---|---| | ||||
| 58 | +| `scripts/06_revision_analyses.py` | 38 s | `rev_bounds.csv`, `rev_spline.csv`, `rev_taxshift_alt.csv`, `rev_cod.csv`, `rev_prb_blocks.csv`, `rev_prb_blocks_trimmed.csv`, `rev_iaao_year_trimmed.csv`, `rev_cities.csv`, `rev_cities_trimmed.csv`, `rev_trim.csv`, `rev_trim_taxshift.csv`, `rev_trim_grid.csv`, `rev_het_trimmed.csv`, `rev_clusters.csv`, `rev_outlier_by_decile.csv`, `rev_misc.csv` | | ||||
| 59 | +| `scripts/05_make_tables.py` (étendu) | 2 s | `rev_trim_grid.tex`, `rev_spline.tex`, `rev_taxshift_alt.tex`, `rev_prb_blocks.tex`, `rev_cities.tex`, `rev_het_trimmed.tex`, `rev_bounds.tex`, `rev_cod.tex` | | ||||
| 60 | + | ||||
| 61 | +Pipeline 01–05 non relancé (résultats de base inchangés et vérifiés cohérents avec `data/processed/analysis.parquet`). | ||||
| 62 | + | ||||
| 63 | +## 5. Éléments non modifiés faute de données / hors périmètre | ||||
| 64 | + | ||||
| 65 | +Figures 1–10 (dessinées sur l'échantillon de base ; les contreparties élaguées sont tabulées) ; wild-cluster bootstrap ; validation des ventes ; | ||||
| 66 | +arrondissements ; recensement ; résolutions d'étalement ; dépendance spatiale. | ||||
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| 1 | +# WP 10 — The Assessment Gap in Quebec : rapport de l'« editorial board » (révision scientifique du 2026-10-17) | ||||
| 2 | + | ||||
| 3 | +Version examinée : 1.0 (août 2026, 29 p., tag `pre-revision-20261017`). Version produite : 1.1 (octobre 2026, 45 p.). | ||||
| 4 | +Données brutes présentes localement (`data/raw/*.parquet`, 100 Mo) : toutes les réanalyses ci-dessous ont été exécutées | ||||
| 5 | +(`scripts/06_revision_analyses.py`, 38 s) ; aucune n'est hypothétique. | ||||
| 6 | + | ||||
| 7 | +## 1. Diagnostic général | ||||
| 8 | + | ||||
| 9 | +Le papier v1.0 repose sur une construction de données remarquable (522 769 ventes appariées à la parcelle aux rôles | ||||
| 10 | +triennaux de 625 municipalités, cellules municipalité × rôle × année) et sur un design propre (effets fixes de cellule | ||||
| 11 | +exploitant la date statutaire de l'art. 46 LFM). Sa conclusion centrale (« régressivité omniprésente, large et | ||||
| 12 | +statistiquement sans ambiguïté ; 95 % des municipalités échouent au test IAAO ; le décile inférieur paie 65 % de trop ; | ||||
| 13 | +Montréal seule exception ; la staleness double l'iniquité ») n'a **pas** résisté à l'examen : | ||||
| 14 | + | ||||
| 15 | +1. **Traitement des ratios extrêmes.** Le trim 1/99 par millésime de rôle laisse dans chaque marché 6,1 % de ratios > 1,5 et | ||||
| 16 | + 3,2 % > 2 (prix déclaré inférieur à la moitié de la valeur au rôle). La règle de l'annexe B de l'IAAO (1,5 × IQR intra-strate, | ||||
| 17 | + limite 5–10 % pour les grands échantillons non validés) retire 9,2 % des ventes, dont **53 % du décile de prix inférieur**. | ||||
| 18 | + Sous cette règle : γ_FE −0,344 → −0,088 ; γ_IV −0,083 → −0,013 (n.s.) ; COD 28,5 → 17,0 ; PRD 1,072 → 1,004 ; PRB −0,029 → | ||||
| 19 | + +0,025 ; part des municipalités COD > 15 : 99 % → 30 % ; PRB < −0,05 : 95 % → 24 % ; PRB < −0,10 : 84 % → 5 % ; décile 1 : | ||||
| 20 | + +64,9 % → +6,6 %. La grille de cinq règles (Table 5) est monotone. Le registre québécois ne portant aucun indicateur de | ||||
| 21 | + pleine concurrence, la v1.1 présente les deux traitements comme **bornes** (supérieure/inférieure) et discute les deux lectures. | ||||
| 22 | +2. **Localisation de la non-proportionnalité.** La v1.0 affirmait, à partir du profil quantile, que « la défaillance est | ||||
| 23 | + concentrée au sommet ». Erreur d'interprétation : τ indexe la distribution conditionnelle de ln AV sachant le prix, pas la | ||||
| 24 | + distribution des prix. La spline (Sunderman et al. 1990) montre β = 0,07 dans le quintile inférieur de prix intra-marché et | ||||
| 25 | + 0,89 / 0,71 / 1,00 / 0,95 au-dessus : la proportionnalité tient sur les 80 % supérieurs et casse **en bas**, exactement où | ||||
| 26 | + siègent les ratios extrêmes. Le binscatter (fig. 6) le montrait déjà. | ||||
| 27 | +3. **Biais d'atténuation.** Exposition formelle ajoutée (éq. 6–8 et annexe A) : plim β_F = β(1−λ) ; borne inverse de | ||||
| 28 | + Kochin–Parks/Kennedy 1/β_R = 1,137 → l'encadrement classique [0,656 ; 1,137] **contient 1** ; l'IV de Clapp (β 0,917, | ||||
| 29 | + F de 1re étape 2 418) implique un écart-type de bruit transactionnel de 0,25 log-point (0,28 pour rationaliser β = 1), invraisemblable | ||||
| 30 | + pour des ventes de pleine concurrence (les AVM hédoniques sur données québécoises comparables, WP 11, atteignent 14–17 % de MdAPE | ||||
| 31 | + erreur de modèle comprise) mais plausible pour un registre contenant des transferts à prix nominal. L'instrument de Clapp | ||||
| 32 | + dépend du rang de AV donc de ε : biais vers le haut, d'où « encadrement descriptif » et non identification ponctuelle. | ||||
| 33 | + L'amplification de l'atténuation par les effets fixes (Griliches–Hausman 1986) explique le « raidissement » pooled → FE. | ||||
| 34 | +4. **Mécanisme « staleness ».** La PRB province (−0,10 en 2021-22, −0,00 en 2024) est un **effet de composition** : la PRB | ||||
| 35 | + médiane des blocs municipalité-année (échantillon de base) est −0,19 à −0,26 **toutes** les années et sans gradient par bande de | ||||
| 36 | + décalage (−0,21/−0,22/−0,19) ; γ_FE est plat par bande (−0,34/−0,34/−0,36). Sur l'échantillon élagué, un effet intra-municipal | ||||
| 37 | + existe mais modeste : PRB −0,044 (2021), −0,043 (2022), −0,016 (2023), ≈ 0 ensuite. Reformulé : « élargit à la marge, ne génère pas ». | ||||
| 38 | +5. **« Exception montréalaise ».** γ_FE intra-Montréal = −0,18 (base) / −0,03 (élagué) ; γ_IV +0,03. La PRB positive tient à la | ||||
| 39 | + composition (49 % de condos) et au caractère pondéré par les niveaux de la PRB. Après élagage, les 10 grandes villes ont COD 9,2–12,3 | ||||
| 40 | + et PRB −0,056 à +0,027 ; Montréal est la **moins** régressive, pas une exception. Retiré du titre de section, des figures et de l'abstract. | ||||
| 41 | +6. **Transfert fiscal.** Dépend de la variable de tri : décile 1 = +64,9 % (prix, médiane), +59,2 % (prix, neutre en recettes), | ||||
| 42 | + +5,6 % (proxy IAAO), −5,4 % (valeur au rôle, image miroir) ; échantillon élagué +6,6 %. Hypothèses explicitées (taux unique de la | ||||
| 43 | + catégorie résiduelle, étalement art. 253.27 et 253.51, incidence statutaire vs capitalisation Oates 1969). Chiffre-phare remplacé | ||||
| 44 | + par un intervalle 6–65 % et un « plus défendable » de 5–7 %. | ||||
| 45 | +7. **Inférence.** 625 clusters emboîtant les cellules : correct. Mais 8 clusters pour « > 10k ventes », 66 pour condos, 1 pour chaque | ||||
| 46 | + ville (HC robuste) : signalé partout. t > 11 « dans toutes les variantes » était faux (6,6 pour le trim 5/95) ; corrigé. | ||||
| 47 | +8. **Cadre institutionnel.** Vérifié sur le texte consolidé de LégisQuébec (17 oct. 2026) : art. 5 (MRC = OMRE), 14 (triennal), 14.2 | ||||
| 48 | + (prolongation ministérielle → décalages jusqu'à 102 mois, 1,5 % des ventes ; la v1.0 disait « 18 à 54 mois »), 46 (texte exact), | ||||
| 49 | + 72 (rôle non déposé reconduit), 124 (révision), 244.29–244.30 (taux variés, catégorie résiduelle), 253.27/253.51 (étalement — | ||||
| 50 | + contredit l'« exactitude » de la v1.0), 264 (proportion médiane et facteur comparatif : le Québec fait **déjà** une étude de niveau | ||||
| 51 | + annuelle). « Taux d'appel faibles » non sourcé → retiré. Absence de déclaration de pleine concurrence ajoutée. | ||||
| 52 | + | ||||
| 53 | +## 2. Diagnostic par section (v1.0 → v1.1) | ||||
| 54 | + | ||||
| 55 | +| Section | Forces | Faiblesses / erreurs trouvées | Traitement | | ||||
| 56 | +|---|---|---|---| | ||||
| 57 | +| Abstract | clair | surclame (« first province-wide evaluation… Canadian » ; « doubles » ; « Montréal only progressive » ; 65 %) | réécrit en bornes | | ||||
| 58 | +| Introduction | motivation, design | mêmes surclames ; « statistically unambiguous » ; quantile mal lu ; « four times stronger » | réécrit ; 3 résultats dont le 1er qualifie les autres | | ||||
| 59 | +| Littérature | bonne couverture US | 2 réf. non vérifiables (Bell 1984, MPAC 2022), 1 titre inventé (Quintos « gradient boosting »), 1 réf. hors sujet (Found & Tomlinson), Baar 1981 sans DOI, mcmillen2022 « online first » (publié JHE 2023) ; pas de mention des règles d'élagage ni des bornes EIV | 6 retirées/remplacées, 17 ajoutées (toutes DOI) ; §sur l'élagage et l'incidence | | ||||
| 60 | +| Institutionnel | pertinent | imprécisions légales (voir 1.8) ; « exact mapping » ; « appeal rates low » | réécrit sur le texte de loi | | ||||
| 61 | +| Données | cascade transparente | 574 « autres » omis ; 85 muni-années à 2 rôles non dits ; rien sur la queue des ratios | ajoutés ; §4.3 « deux traitements » | | ||||
| 62 | +| Méthodologie | correcte | pas d'algèbre de l'atténuation ; PRB sans le critère ±0,10 ; COD 15 appliqué aux plex/chalets (norme 20) ; quantile mal interprété ; tax shift sans hypothèses | éq. 1–9 ; bornes ; spline ; §incidence | | ||||
| 63 | +| Résultats | tables générées | « 0.75 log points » (= points de %) ; « land-heavy noisy » contredit par coefficient n.s. ; « Montréal lone progressive » ; « accelerating rate at the top » | corrigés ; 3 sous-sections nouvelles (sensibilité, spline, grandes villes) | | ||||
| 64 | +| Robustesse | battery utile | t > 11 faux ; « < 0.005 » faux (0,006) ; trim 5/95 pooled ≠ base ; F « enormous » non chiffré | corrigés ; 2 tables (COD temps, PRB blocs) ; F = 2 418 | | ||||
| 65 | +| Discussion | mécanismes | « doubling » ; Montréal ; absence du mécanisme n° 1 (registre) | réécrit (4 couches, 4 leviers dont validation des ventes) | | ||||
| 66 | +| Conclusion | — | reprend les surclames | réécrite | | ||||
| 67 | + | ||||
| 68 | +## 3. Méthodologie : verdict point par point (§3 du master prompt) | ||||
| 69 | + | ||||
| 70 | +- Spécification justifiée : oui (Cheng log-log, EF cellule). Hypothèses explicites : désormais oui (éq. 6). | ||||
| 71 | +- Variables définies : oui ; précision ajoutée sur les cellules à deux rôles. | ||||
| 72 | +- Effets fixes appropriés : oui ; mais ils **amplifient** l'atténuation — maintenant dit. | ||||
| 73 | +- Dépendance spatiale/temporelle : clustering municipal emboîtant les cellules, défendable ; dépendance spatiale inter-municipale non | ||||
| 74 | + traitée (limite notée). Ajustement temporel intra-année : vérifié sans effet (Table 14). | ||||
| 75 | +- Erreurs-types : correctes au niveau agrégé ; peu de clusters dans trois sous-groupes → signalé ; wild bootstrap recommandé (non fait). | ||||
| 76 | +- Construction d'échantillon transparente : oui, et désormais la décision la plus lourde (élagage) est exhibée. | ||||
| 77 | +- Robustesse adressant les vraies menaces : la v1.0 testait tout sauf la menace décisive ; corrigé. | ||||
| 78 | +- Interprétation des coefficients : quantile corrigée ; « log points » corrigé. | ||||
| 79 | +- Significativité statistique vs économique : les γ_IV élagués (−0,01) sont distingués des γ_FE significatifs mais petits. | ||||
| 80 | +- Affirmations causales : « staleness is a first-order driver » retirée ; mécanismes présentés comme interprétations. | ||||
| 81 | + | ||||
| 82 | +## 4. Littérature | ||||
| 83 | + | ||||
| 84 | +Références v1.0 : 44 ; v1.1 : 51, **toutes vérifiées** (Crossref via API, DOI inscrit ; RePEc pour Cheng 1974 ; pages éditeur Lincoln | ||||
| 85 | +Institute pour McMillen 2011 et Bird–Slack–Tassonyi 2012 ; bibliographie secondaire pour Gloudemans 2011 F&E ; texte de loi pour LFM). | ||||
| 86 | +Retirées : Bell 1984 (introuvable), MPAC 2022 (introuvable), Found & Tomlinson 2017 (hors sujet), Baar 1981 (sans DOI, non nécessaire), | ||||
| 87 | +Clapp 1990 « vacant land » (non citée), Quintos « gradient boosting » (titre inexistant → remplacée par Quintos 2020 Gini, DOI 10.63642/1357-1419.1225). | ||||
| 88 | +Corrigées : mcmillen2022allocative → McMillen & Singh 2023 JHE 61:101950 ; Oates & Fischel pages 415–433 ; Cheng 1974 numéro 3–4 ; | ||||
| 89 | +Avenancio-León & Howard DOI 10.1093/qje/qjac009 ; hodge2017, mcmillen2020, ross2012, plummer2014, etc. : DOI ajoutés. | ||||
| 90 | +Ajoutées (DOI) : Cheng 1970 ; Kochin & Parks 1984 (réponse) ; Klepper & Leamer 1984 ; Griliches & Hausman 1986 ; Koenker & Bassett 1978 ; | ||||
| 91 | +Cameron & Miller 2015 ; Abadie et al. 2023 ; Birch & Sunderman 2014 ; Birch, Sunderman & Radetsky 2017 ; Cornia & Slade 2005 ; McMillen 2013 ; | ||||
| 92 | +McMillen & Singh 2023, 2026 ; Harris & Lehman 2001 ; Bird, Slack & Tassonyi 2012 ; Gloudemans 2011 (PRB) ; Oates 1969 et Oates & Fischel 2016 | ||||
| 93 | +(déjà au .bib, désormais citées). | ||||
| 94 | + | ||||
| 95 | +## 5. Résultats : incohérences trouvées et corrigées | ||||
| 96 | + | ||||
| 97 | +Voir CHANGELOG §2. Principales : abstract/intro/conclusion vs tables (65 %, « 4×», « doubles »), t-stats, « < 0.005 », « 18–54 months », | ||||
| 98 | +unités du tableau horizontal, classes manquantes (574), interprétation τ, « exact » du transfert fiscal, norme COD par classe. | ||||
| 99 | + | ||||
| 100 | +## 6. Réanalyses exécutées (script 06, sorties `results/reproduced/rev_*.csv`, tables `results/tables/rev_*.tex`) | ||||
| 101 | + | ||||
| 102 | +Bornes EIV + 1re étape ; spline 5 segments (EF cellule, SE clusterisées) ; transfert fiscal × 3 tris × 2 référentiels + part d'outliers | ||||
| 103 | +par décile ; COD municipal × 3 schémas temporels ; PRB par bande de décalage et par année sur blocs muni-année (base et élagé) ; | ||||
| 104 | +γ_FE/γ_IV des 10 grandes villes (base et élagé) ; grille de 5 règles d'élagage × batterie complète ; hétérogénéité élagée ; comptes de clusters. | ||||
| 105 | + | ||||
| 106 | +## 7. Analyses recommandées, non exécutées | ||||
| 107 | + | ||||
| 108 | +- Wild-cluster bootstrap (Cameron–Miller) pour les sous-groupes à 8 et 66 clusters. | ||||
| 109 | +- Validation des ventes : appariement au Registre foncier (acte, lien vendeur-acheteur, succession, prix « 1 $ et autres considérations ») | ||||
| 110 | + pour trancher la nature des 9 % de ratios extrêmes — **la** extension décisive ; données non disponibles dans le dépôt. | ||||
| 111 | +- Analyse par arrondissement à Montréal et par unité de voisinage du rôle (`role_unite_voisinage`, présent dans les données brutes). | ||||
| 112 | +- Liaison aux caractéristiques de recensement (incidence par revenu). | ||||
| 113 | +- Prise en compte des résolutions d'étalement (art. 253.27) par municipalité pour un transfert fiscal exact. | ||||
| 114 | +- Dépendance spatiale des erreurs d'évaluation (Moran, SE Conley). | ||||
| 115 | + | ||||
| 116 | +## 8. Limites restantes | ||||
| 117 | + | ||||
| 118 | +Absence d'indicateur de pleine concurrence (borne irréductible) ; troncature < 50 k$ ; période 2021-26 atypique ; révisions/rénovations | ||||
| 119 | +non observées ; incidence statutaire ; peu de clusters dans trois sous-groupes. | ||||
| 120 | + | ||||
| 121 | +## 9. Maturité pour publication | ||||
| 122 | + | ||||
| 123 | +Cible : *Regional Science and Urban Economics* (repli *National Tax Journal*). La v1.1 est honnête et défendable ; sa contribution | ||||
| 124 | +est désormais double (première ratio study provinciale canadienne ; démonstration que l'« assessment gap » mesuré dépend de la règle | ||||
| 125 | +d'élagage — un point méthodologique transférable à la littérature US). Risques de rejet : (i) un rapporteur peut juger la conclusion | ||||
| 126 | +« entre les bornes » insuffisamment tranchée — la réponse est l'extension « validation des ventes » ; (ii) RSUE attendra davantage de | ||||
| 127 | +spatial (arrondissements, voisinages) ; (iii) NTJ demandera l'incidence par revenu. Recommandation : soumettre à NTJ ou au *Journal of | ||||
| 128 | +Housing Economics* en l'état ; pour RSUE, ajouter l'analyse par unité de voisinage avant soumission. | ||||
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| 1 | +% Author: Simon-Pierre Boucher — contact@spboucher.ai | ||||
| 2 | +% ============================================================================ | ||||
| 3 | +\section{Measurement-error bounds and first stage} | ||||
| 4 | +\label{app:bounds} | ||||
| 5 | + | ||||
| 6 | +This appendix derives the bounds used in Section~\ref{sec:meas} and | ||||
| 7 | +reports the moments behind them. Write the within-cell demeaned variables | ||||
| 8 | +as in equation~\eqref{eq:me}, $\ln SP_i = \ln V_i + u_i$ and $\ln AV_i = | ||||
| 9 | +\beta \ln V_i + \varepsilon_i$, with $u_i$, $\varepsilon_i$ and $\ln V_i$ | ||||
| 10 | +mutually uncorrelated and $\sigma^2_V$, $\sigma^2_u$, $\sigma^2_\varepsilon$ | ||||
| 11 | +their variances. The observable within-cell moments are | ||||
| 12 | +\begin{equation} | ||||
| 13 | +\operatorname{Var}(\ln SP) = \sigma^2_V + \sigma^2_u, \qquad | ||||
| 14 | +\operatorname{Var}(\ln AV) = \beta^2\sigma^2_V + \sigma^2_\varepsilon, \qquad | ||||
| 15 | +\operatorname{Cov}(\ln AV, \ln SP) = \beta\,\sigma^2_V . | ||||
| 16 | +\label{eq:moments} | ||||
| 17 | +\end{equation} | ||||
| 18 | +The forward slope is $\hat\beta_F = \operatorname{Cov}/\operatorname{Var}(\ln | ||||
| 19 | +SP) \to \beta\sigma^2_V/(\sigma^2_V+\sigma^2_u) \le \beta$, and the inverse | ||||
| 20 | +of the reverse slope is $1/\hat\beta_R = \operatorname{Var}(\ln | ||||
| 21 | +AV)/\operatorname{Cov} \to \beta + \sigma^2_\varepsilon/(\beta\sigma^2_V) | ||||
| 22 | +\ge \beta$, which gives equation~\eqref{eq:bounds}. Given $\hat\beta_F$, | ||||
| 23 | +the noise share $\lambda = \sigma^2_u/\operatorname{Var}(\ln SP)$ that would | ||||
| 24 | +rationalise a true elasticity $\beta^\ast$ is $\lambda = 1 - | ||||
| 25 | +\hat\beta_F/\beta^\ast$, and the implied standard deviation of transaction | ||||
| 26 | +noise is $\sqrt{\lambda\operatorname{Var}(\ln SP)}$. Table~\ref{tab:bounds} | ||||
| 27 | +reports the moments, the bounds, the noise shares implied by $\beta^\ast = | ||||
| 28 | +1$ and by the Clapp estimate, and the first stage of the Clapp instrument. | ||||
| 29 | +Three features deserve comment. The bracket $[0.656, 1.137]$ contains one, | ||||
| 30 | +so the classical errors-in-variables model alone cannot establish | ||||
| 31 | +regressivity on the baseline sample; this is a property of the large | ||||
| 32 | +assessment-error variance (the within-cell correlation is 0.76), not of | ||||
| 33 | +the sample size. Rationalising proportionality requires a transaction-noise | ||||
| 34 | +standard deviation of 0.28 log points, and the Clapp estimate itself | ||||
| 35 | +implies 0.25; both exceed the out-of-sample dispersion of hedonic | ||||
| 36 | +predictions around prices on comparable Quebec data, which suggests that | ||||
| 37 | +part of the ``noise'' the instrument discounts is non-market sales rather | ||||
| 38 | +than bargaining dispersion. The first stage is strong by any standard, so | ||||
| 39 | +the instrument's limitation is the dependence of $Z$ on the assessment | ||||
| 40 | +rank discussed in Section~\ref{sec:meas}, not weak identification. | ||||
| 41 | + | ||||
| 42 | +\begin{table}[h] | ||||
| 43 | +\centering | ||||
| 44 | +\begin{threeparttable} | ||||
| 45 | +\caption{Within-cell moments, measurement-error bounds and Clapp first stage, baseline sample} | ||||
| 46 | +\label{tab:bounds} | ||||
| 47 | +\small | ||||
| 48 | +\input{../results/tables/rev_bounds} | ||||
| 49 | +\begin{tablenotes}[flushleft]\footnotesize | ||||
| 50 | +\item \textit{Notes:} All moments are computed on variables demeaned | ||||
| 51 | +within the 2{,}884 municipality~$\times$~roll~$\times$~sale-year cells. | ||||
| 52 | +The first-stage regression is of the demeaned $\ln SP$ on $Z \in | ||||
| 53 | +\{-1,0,+1\}$ with municipality-clustered standard errors; $F$ is the | ||||
| 54 | +square of the cluster-robust $t$-statistic. | ||||
| 55 | +\end{tablenotes} | ||||
| 56 | +\end{threeparttable} | ||||
| 57 | +\end{table} | ||||
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@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ | |||||
| 30 | \usepackage{booktabs} | 30 | \usepackage{booktabs} | ||
| 31 | \usepackage{threeparttable} | 31 | \usepackage{threeparttable} | ||
| 32 | \usepackage{makecell} | 32 | \usepackage{makecell} | ||
| 33 | +\usepackage{url} | ||||
| 34 | +\usepackage{pdflscape} | ||||
| 35 | +\usepackage{placeins} | ||||
| 33 | 36 | ||||
| 34 | % ---------------------------------------------------------------- figures | 37 | % ---------------------------------------------------------------- figures | ||
| 35 | \usepackage{graphicx} | 38 | \usepackage{graphicx} | ||
@@ -66,9 +69,9 @@ | |||||
| 66 | \newcommand{\WPtitle}{The Assessment Gap in Quebec} | 69 | \newcommand{\WPtitle}{The Assessment Gap in Quebec} | ||
| 67 | \newcommand{\WPsubtitle}{Vertical and Horizontal Inequity in Municipal Property | 70 | \newcommand{\WPsubtitle}{Vertical and Horizontal Inequity in Municipal Property | ||
| 68 | Valuation: Evidence from 522{,}769 Sales Matched to the Assessment Roll} | 71 | Valuation: Evidence from 522{,}769 Sales Matched to the Assessment Roll} | ||
| 69 | −\newcommand{\WPdate}{August 2026} | 72 | +\newcommand{\WPdate}{October 2026} | ||
| 70 | −\newcommand{\WPversion}{1.0} | 73 | +\newcommand{\WPversion}{1.1} | ||
| 71 | −\newcommand{\WPkeywords}{property tax, assessment, vertical equity, regressivity, ratio study, Quebec} | 74 | +\newcommand{\WPkeywords}{property tax, assessment ratio, vertical equity, regressivity, ratio study, measurement error, Quebec} | ||
| 72 | \newcommand{\WPjel}{H71, H22, R51, R31} | 75 | \newcommand{\WPjel}{H71, H22, R51, R31} | ||
| 73 | 76 | ||||
| 74 | \newcommand{\WPauthor}{Simon-Pierre Boucher} | 77 | \newcommand{\WPauthor}{Simon-Pierre Boucher} | ||
@@ -80,27 +83,36 @@ | |||||
| 80 | 83 | ||||
| 81 | \newcommand{\WPabstract}{% | 84 | \newcommand{\WPabstract}{% | ||
| 82 | Municipal property taxes are levied on assessed values, so any systematic | 85 | Municipal property taxes are levied on assessed values, so any systematic | ||
| 83 | −relationship between assessment accuracy and market value silently | 86 | +relationship between assessment ratios and market value redistributes the | ||
| 84 | −redistributes the tax burden. Matching 522{,}769 residential transactions | 87 | +tax burden within a municipality. We match 522{,}769 residential sales | ||
| 85 | −from 2021--2026 to the triennial assessment rolls of 625 Quebec | 88 | +recorded in Quebec between 2021 and 2026 to the triennial assessment rolls | ||
| 86 | −municipalities at the parcel level, we provide the first province-wide | 89 | +of 625 municipalities at the parcel level and provide the first | ||
| 87 | −evaluation of vertical and horizontal equity in Canadian property assessment. | 90 | +province-wide ratio study of vertical and horizontal assessment equity for | ||
| 88 | −Assessment ratios decline steeply with price: within | 91 | +a Canadian province. Because the \textit{Loi sur la fiscalit\'e | ||
| 89 | −municipality~$\times$~roll~$\times$~sale-year markets, the elasticity of the | 92 | +municipale} pins every roll to a single statutory market-condition date, | ||
| 90 | −assessment ratio with respect to the sale price is $-0.34$, and a rank-based | 93 | +municipality~$\times$~roll~$\times$~sale-year fixed effects separate the | ||
| 91 | −instrumental-variable estimator in the spirit of \mbox{Clapp (1990)}---which | 94 | +mechanical drift of ratios between reference dates from within-market | ||
| 92 | −purges the attenuation bias that pushes least-squares tests toward spurious | 95 | +inequity by design. The central finding is that the measured degree of | ||
| 93 | −regressivity---still yields $-0.08$ ($t\approx4$). IAAO ratio-study | 96 | +regressivity hinges on the treatment of extreme assessment ratios. Under a | ||
| 94 | −diagnostics place 95\% of municipalities below the acceptable price-related | 97 | +lenient 1/99 trim, the within-market elasticity of the assessment ratio | ||
| 95 | −bias band and 99\% above the COD uniformity ceiling; Montr\'eal is the only | 98 | +with respect to price is $-0.34$ ($-0.08$ under a rank instrument in the | ||
| 96 | −large market whose assessments are progressive. Regressivity is strongest for | 99 | +spirit of Clapp, 1990) and 95\% of municipalities fall below the IAAO | ||
| 97 | −single-family homes, older buildings, properties with a high assessed land | 100 | +price-related-bias band. Under the IAAO outlier rule, which removes 9\% of | ||
| 98 | −share, and smaller municipalities, and it doubles in years when market prices | 101 | +sales concentrated in the bottom price decile, the elasticity is $-0.09$ | ||
| 99 | −decouple from the rolls' reference dates, pointing to infrequent revaluation | 102 | +($-0.01$ and insignificant under the instrument), the province-wide PRB is | ||
| 100 | −as a first-order mechanism. The implied intra-municipal tax shift is large: | 103 | +$+0.02$, the COD is 17, and three quarters of municipalities meet the | ||
| 101 | −the median dwelling in the bottom within-market price decile pays roughly | 104 | +vertical-equity standard. A piecewise specification shows that | ||
| 102 | −65\% more property tax than it would under uniform assessment, while the top | 105 | +proportionality holds across the upper 80\% of each market's price | ||
| 103 | −decile pays about 5\% less.} | 106 | +distribution and fails only in the bottom quintile. Two patterns are | ||
| 107 | +invariant to the trimming rule: condominiums are assessed proportionally | ||||
| 108 | +while single-family homes, plexes, older buildings, land-heavy properties | ||||
| 109 | +and small municipalities remain mildly regressive, and within-municipality | ||||
| 110 | +price-related bias widened in 2021--2022 when the post-pandemic boom pulled | ||||
| 111 | +prices away from the rolls. The implied overpayment by the bottom | ||||
| 112 | +within-market price decile ranges from about 6\% to 65\% depending on | ||||
| 113 | +whether extreme-ratio sales are treated as market transactions, and the top | ||||
| 114 | +decile underpays by 3--5\%; narrowing that range requires sale-validation | ||||
| 115 | +data that Quebec's registries do not currently provide.} | ||||
| 104 | 116 | ||||
| 105 | \hypersetup{pdftitle={The Assessment Gap in Quebec}, pdfauthor={Simon-Pierre Boucher}} | 117 | \hypersetup{pdftitle={The Assessment Gap in Quebec}, pdfauthor={Simon-Pierre Boucher}} | ||
| 106 | 118 | ||||
@@ -119,6 +131,9 @@ decile pays about 5\% less.} | |||||
| 119 | \input{sections/discussion} | 131 | \input{sections/discussion} | ||
| 120 | \input{sections/conclusion} | 132 | \input{sections/conclusion} | ||
| 121 | 133 | ||||
| 134 | +\appendix | ||||
| 135 | +\input{appendix/appendix} | ||||
| 136 | + | ||||
| 122 | \newpage | 137 | \newpage | ||
| 123 | \bibliography{references} | 138 | \bibliography{references} | ||
| 124 | 139 | ||||
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@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ | |||||
| 30 | \usepackage{booktabs} | 30 | \usepackage{booktabs} | ||
| 31 | \usepackage{threeparttable} | 31 | \usepackage{threeparttable} | ||
| 32 | \usepackage{makecell} | 32 | \usepackage{makecell} | ||
| 33 | +\usepackage{url} | ||||
| 34 | +\usepackage{pdflscape} | ||||
| 35 | +\usepackage{placeins} | ||||
| 33 | 36 | ||||
| 34 | % ---------------------------------------------------------------- figures | 37 | % ---------------------------------------------------------------- figures | ||
| 35 | \usepackage{graphicx} | 38 | \usepackage{graphicx} | ||
@@ -66,9 +69,9 @@ | |||||
| 66 | \newcommand{\WPtitle}{The Assessment Gap in Quebec} | 69 | \newcommand{\WPtitle}{The Assessment Gap in Quebec} | ||
| 67 | \newcommand{\WPsubtitle}{Vertical and Horizontal Inequity in Municipal Property | 70 | \newcommand{\WPsubtitle}{Vertical and Horizontal Inequity in Municipal Property | ||
| 68 | Valuation: Evidence from 522{,}769 Sales Matched to the Assessment Roll} | 71 | Valuation: Evidence from 522{,}769 Sales Matched to the Assessment Roll} | ||
| 69 | −\newcommand{\WPdate}{August 2026} | 72 | +\newcommand{\WPdate}{October 2026} | ||
| 70 | −\newcommand{\WPversion}{1.0} | 73 | +\newcommand{\WPversion}{1.1} | ||
| 71 | −\newcommand{\WPkeywords}{property tax, assessment, vertical equity, regressivity, ratio study, Quebec} | 74 | +\newcommand{\WPkeywords}{property tax, assessment ratio, vertical equity, regressivity, ratio study, measurement error, Quebec} | ||
| 72 | \newcommand{\WPjel}{H71, H22, R51, R31} | 75 | \newcommand{\WPjel}{H71, H22, R51, R31} | ||
| 73 | 76 | ||||
| 74 | \newcommand{\WPauthor}{Simon-Pierre Boucher} | 77 | \newcommand{\WPauthor}{Simon-Pierre Boucher} | ||
@@ -80,27 +83,36 @@ | |||||
| 80 | 83 | ||||
| 81 | \newcommand{\WPabstract}{% | 84 | \newcommand{\WPabstract}{% | ||
| 82 | Municipal property taxes are levied on assessed values, so any systematic | 85 | Municipal property taxes are levied on assessed values, so any systematic | ||
| 83 | −relationship between assessment accuracy and market value silently | 86 | +relationship between assessment ratios and market value redistributes the | ||
| 84 | −redistributes the tax burden. Matching 522{,}769 residential transactions | 87 | +tax burden within a municipality. We match 522{,}769 residential sales | ||
| 85 | −from 2021--2026 to the triennial assessment rolls of 625 Quebec | 88 | +recorded in Quebec between 2021 and 2026 to the triennial assessment rolls | ||
| 86 | −municipalities at the parcel level, we provide the first province-wide | 89 | +of 625 municipalities at the parcel level and provide the first | ||
| 87 | −evaluation of vertical and horizontal equity in Canadian property assessment. | 90 | +province-wide ratio study of vertical and horizontal assessment equity for | ||
| 88 | −Assessment ratios decline steeply with price: within | 91 | +a Canadian province. Because the \textit{Loi sur la fiscalit\'e | ||
| 89 | −municipality~$\times$~roll~$\times$~sale-year markets, the elasticity of the | 92 | +municipale} pins every roll to a single statutory market-condition date, | ||
| 90 | −assessment ratio with respect to the sale price is $-0.34$, and a rank-based | 93 | +municipality~$\times$~roll~$\times$~sale-year fixed effects separate the | ||
| 91 | −instrumental-variable estimator in the spirit of \mbox{Clapp (1990)}---which | 94 | +mechanical drift of ratios between reference dates from within-market | ||
| 92 | −purges the attenuation bias that pushes least-squares tests toward spurious | 95 | +inequity by design. The central finding is that the measured degree of | ||
| 93 | −regressivity---still yields $-0.08$ ($t\approx4$). IAAO ratio-study | 96 | +regressivity hinges on the treatment of extreme assessment ratios. Under a | ||
| 94 | −diagnostics place 95\% of municipalities below the acceptable price-related | 97 | +lenient 1/99 trim, the within-market elasticity of the assessment ratio | ||
| 95 | −bias band and 99\% above the COD uniformity ceiling; Montr\'eal is the only | 98 | +with respect to price is $-0.34$ ($-0.08$ under a rank instrument in the | ||
| 96 | −large market whose assessments are progressive. Regressivity is strongest for | 99 | +spirit of Clapp, 1990) and 95\% of municipalities fall below the IAAO | ||
| 97 | −single-family homes, older buildings, properties with a high assessed land | 100 | +price-related-bias band. Under the IAAO outlier rule, which removes 9\% of | ||
| 98 | −share, and smaller municipalities, and it doubles in years when market prices | 101 | +sales concentrated in the bottom price decile, the elasticity is $-0.09$ | ||
| 99 | −decouple from the rolls' reference dates, pointing to infrequent revaluation | 102 | +($-0.01$ and insignificant under the instrument), the province-wide PRB is | ||
| 100 | −as a first-order mechanism. The implied intra-municipal tax shift is large: | 103 | +$+0.02$, the COD is 17, and three quarters of municipalities meet the | ||
| 101 | −the median dwelling in the bottom within-market price decile pays roughly | 104 | +vertical-equity standard. A piecewise specification shows that | ||
| 102 | −65\% more property tax than it would under uniform assessment, while the top | 105 | +proportionality holds across the upper 80\% of each market's price | ||
| 103 | −decile pays about 5\% less.} | 106 | +distribution and fails only in the bottom quintile. Two patterns are | ||
| 107 | +invariant to the trimming rule: condominiums are assessed proportionally | ||||
| 108 | +while single-family homes, plexes, older buildings, land-heavy properties | ||||
| 109 | +and small municipalities remain mildly regressive, and within-municipality | ||||
| 110 | +price-related bias widened in 2021--2022 when the post-pandemic boom pulled | ||||
| 111 | +prices away from the rolls. The implied overpayment by the bottom | ||||
| 112 | +within-market price decile ranges from about 6\% to 65\% depending on | ||||
| 113 | +whether extreme-ratio sales are treated as market transactions, and the top | ||||
| 114 | +decile underpays by 3--5\%; narrowing that range requires sale-validation | ||||
| 115 | +data that Quebec's registries do not currently provide.} | ||||
| 104 | 116 | ||||
| 105 | \hypersetup{pdftitle={The Assessment Gap in Quebec}, pdfauthor={}} | 117 | \hypersetup{pdftitle={The Assessment Gap in Quebec}, pdfauthor={}} | ||
| 106 | 118 | ||||
@@ -119,6 +131,9 @@ decile pays about 5\% less.} | |||||
| 119 | \input{sections/discussion} | 131 | \input{sections/discussion} | ||
| 120 | \input{sections/conclusion} | 132 | \input{sections/conclusion} | ||
| 121 | 133 | ||||
| 134 | +\appendix | ||||
| 135 | +\input{appendix/appendix} | ||||
| 136 | + | ||||
| 122 | \newpage | 137 | \newpage | ||
| 123 | \bibliography{references} | 138 | \bibliography{references} | ||
| 124 | 139 | ||||
modified
paper/references.bib
+344 −198
@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@ | |||||
| 1 | −@comment{ Author: Simon-Pierre Boucher (contact at spboucher.ai) -- Bibliography for UQO Working Paper No 10 } | 1 | +@comment{ Author: Simon-Pierre Boucher (contact at spboucher.ai) -- Bibliography for UQO Working Paper No 10. | ||
| 2 | + Revised 2026-10-17: every entry verified against Crossref (DOI recorded) or the publisher's page; | ||||
| 3 | + see docs/CHANGELOG-REVISION.md for the verification log. } | ||||
| 2 | 4 | ||||
| 5 | +% ------------------------------------------------------------------ ratio-study tests | ||||
| 3 | @article{paglin1972equity, | 6 | @article{paglin1972equity, | ||
| 4 | author = {Paglin, Morton and Fogarty, Michael}, | 7 | author = {Paglin, Morton and Fogarty, Michael}, | ||
| 5 | title = {Equity and the Property Tax: A New Conceptual Focus}, | 8 | title = {Equity and the Property Tax: A New Conceptual Focus}, | ||
@@ -7,17 +10,30 @@ | |||||
| 7 | year = {1972}, | 10 | year = {1972}, | ||
| 8 | volume = {25}, | 11 | volume = {25}, | ||
| 9 | number = {4}, | 12 | number = {4}, | ||
| 10 | − pages = {557--565} | 13 | + pages = {557--565}, | ||
| 14 | + doi = {10.1086/ntj41791839} | ||||
| 15 | +} | ||||
| 16 | + | ||||
| 17 | +@article{cheng1970common, | ||||
| 18 | + author = {Cheng, Pao Lun}, | ||||
| 19 | + title = {The Common Level of Assessment in Property Taxation}, | ||||
| 20 | + journal = {National Tax Journal}, | ||||
| 21 | + year = {1970}, | ||||
| 22 | + volume = {23}, | ||||
| 23 | + number = {1}, | ||||
| 24 | + pages = {50--65}, | ||||
| 25 | + doi = {10.1086/ntj41791700} | ||||
| 11 | } | 26 | } | ||
| 12 | 27 | ||||
| 13 | @article{cheng1974property, | 28 | @article{cheng1974property, | ||
| 14 | author = {Cheng, Pao Lun}, | 29 | author = {Cheng, Pao Lun}, | ||
| 15 | title = {Property Taxation, Assessment Performance, and Its Measurement}, | 30 | title = {Property Taxation, Assessment Performance, and Its Measurement}, | ||
| 16 | − journal = {Public Finance}, | 31 | + journal = {Public Finance / Finances Publiques}, | ||
| 17 | year = {1974}, | 32 | year = {1974}, | ||
| 18 | volume = {29}, | 33 | volume = {29}, | ||
| 19 | − number = {3}, | 34 | + number = {3--4}, | ||
| 20 | − pages = {268--284} | 35 | + pages = {268--284}, | ||
| 36 | + note = {RePEc: pfi:pubfin:v:29:y:1974:i:3-4:p:268-84} | ||||
| 21 | } | 37 | } | ||
| 22 | 38 | ||||
| 23 | @article{kochin1982vertical, | 39 | @article{kochin1982vertical, | ||
@@ -27,27 +43,30 @@ | |||||
| 27 | year = {1982}, | 43 | year = {1982}, | ||
| 28 | volume = {20}, | 44 | volume = {20}, | ||
| 29 | number = {4}, | 45 | number = {4}, | ||
| 30 | − pages = {511--532} | 46 | + pages = {511--532}, | ||
| 47 | + doi = {10.1111/j.1465-7295.1982.tb00364.x} | ||||
| 31 | } | 48 | } | ||
| 32 | 49 | ||||
| 33 | −@article{bell1984administrative, | 50 | +@article{kennedy1984unfair, | ||
| 34 | − author = {Bell, Earl J.}, | 51 | + author = {Kennedy, Peter}, | ||
| 35 | − title = {Administrative Inequity and Property Assessment: The Case for the Traditional Approach}, | 52 | + title = {On an Unfair Appraisal of Vertical Equity in Real Estate Assessment}, | ||
| 36 | − journal = {Property Tax Journal}, | 53 | + journal = {Economic Inquiry}, | ||
| 37 | year = {1984}, | 54 | year = {1984}, | ||
| 38 | − volume = {3}, | 55 | + volume = {22}, | ||
| 39 | number = {2}, | 56 | number = {2}, | ||
| 40 | − pages = {123--131} | 57 | + pages = {287--290}, | ||
| 58 | + doi = {10.1111/j.1465-7295.1984.tb00686.x} | ||||
| 41 | } | 59 | } | ||
| 42 | 60 | ||||
| 43 | −@article{kennedy1984unfair, | 61 | +@article{kochin1984reply, | ||
| 44 | − author = {Kennedy, Peter}, | 62 | + author = {Kochin, Levis A. and Parks, Richard W.}, | ||
| 45 | − title = {On an Unfair Appraisal of Vertical Equity in Real Estate Assessment}, | 63 | + title = {Vertical Equity in Real Estate Assessment: Reply to {Kennedy}}, | ||
| 46 | journal = {Economic Inquiry}, | 64 | journal = {Economic Inquiry}, | ||
| 47 | year = {1984}, | 65 | year = {1984}, | ||
| 48 | volume = {22}, | 66 | volume = {22}, | ||
| 49 | number = {2}, | 67 | number = {2}, | ||
| 50 | − pages = {287--290} | 68 | + pages = {291--296}, | ||
| 69 | + doi = {10.1111/j.1465-7295.1984.tb00687.x} | ||||
| 51 | } | 70 | } | ||
| 52 | 71 | ||||
| 53 | @article{sunderman1990testing, | 72 | @article{sunderman1990testing, | ||
@@ -57,7 +76,8 @@ | |||||
| 57 | year = {1990}, | 76 | year = {1990}, | ||
| 58 | volume = {5}, | 77 | volume = {5}, | ||
| 59 | number = {3}, | 78 | number = {3}, | ||
| 60 | − pages = {319--334} | 79 | + pages = {319--334}, | ||
| 80 | + doi = {10.1080/10835547.1990.12090625} | ||||
| 61 | } | 81 | } | ||
| 62 | 82 | ||||
| 63 | @article{clapp1990new, | 83 | @article{clapp1990new, | ||
@@ -67,7 +87,8 @@ | |||||
| 67 | year = {1990}, | 87 | year = {1990}, | ||
| 68 | volume = {3}, | 88 | volume = {3}, | ||
| 69 | number = {3}, | 89 | number = {3}, | ||
| 70 | − pages = {233--249} | 90 | + pages = {233--249}, | ||
| 91 | + doi = {10.1007/BF00216188} | ||||
| 71 | } | 92 | } | ||
| 72 | 93 | ||||
| 73 | @article{sirmans1995vertical, | 94 | @article{sirmans1995vertical, | ||
@@ -77,17 +98,41 @@ | |||||
| 77 | year = {1995}, | 98 | year = {1995}, | ||
| 78 | volume = {48}, | 99 | volume = {48}, | ||
| 79 | number = {1}, | 100 | number = {1}, | ||
| 80 | − pages = {71--84} | 101 | + pages = {71--84}, | ||
| 102 | + doi = {10.1086/ntj41789124} | ||||
| 103 | +} | ||||
| 104 | + | ||||
| 105 | +@article{goolsby1997assessment, | ||||
| 106 | + author = {Goolsby, William C.}, | ||||
| 107 | + title = {Assessment Error in the Valuation of Owner-Occupied Housing}, | ||||
| 108 | + journal = {Journal of Real Estate Research}, | ||||
| 109 | + year = {1997}, | ||||
| 110 | + volume = {13}, | ||||
| 111 | + number = {1}, | ||||
| 112 | + pages = {33--45}, | ||||
| 113 | + doi = {10.1080/10835547.1997.12090863} | ||||
| 81 | } | 114 | } | ||
| 82 | 115 | ||||
| 83 | @article{allen2002measuring, | 116 | @article{allen2002measuring, | ||
| 84 | author = {Allen, Marcus T. and Dare, William H.}, | 117 | author = {Allen, Marcus T. and Dare, William H.}, | ||
| 85 | − title = {Identifying Determinants of Horizontal Property Tax Inequity: Evidence from Florida}, | 118 | + title = {Identifying Determinants of Horizontal Property Tax Inequity: Evidence from {Florida}}, | ||
| 86 | journal = {Journal of Real Estate Research}, | 119 | journal = {Journal of Real Estate Research}, | ||
| 87 | year = {2002}, | 120 | year = {2002}, | ||
| 88 | volume = {24}, | 121 | volume = {24}, | ||
| 89 | number = {2}, | 122 | number = {2}, | ||
| 90 | − pages = {153--164} | 123 | + pages = {153--164}, | ||
| 124 | + doi = {10.1080/10835547.2002.12091091} | ||||
| 125 | +} | ||||
| 126 | + | ||||
| 127 | +@article{cornia2005multifamily, | ||||
| 128 | + author = {Cornia, Gary C. and Slade, Barrett A.}, | ||||
| 129 | + title = {Property Taxation of Multifamily Housing: An Empirical Analysis of Vertical and Horizontal Equity}, | ||||
| 130 | + journal = {Journal of Real Estate Research}, | ||||
| 131 | + year = {2005}, | ||||
| 132 | + volume = {27}, | ||||
| 133 | + number = {1}, | ||||
| 134 | + pages = {17--46}, | ||||
| 135 | + doi = {10.1080/10835547.2005.12091152} | ||||
| 91 | } | 136 | } | ||
| 92 | 137 | ||||
| 93 | @article{sirmans2008vertical, | 138 | @article{sirmans2008vertical, | ||
@@ -97,7 +142,84 @@ | |||||
| 97 | year = {2008}, | 142 | year = {2008}, | ||
| 98 | volume = {16}, | 143 | volume = {16}, | ||
| 99 | number = {2}, | 144 | number = {2}, | ||
| 100 | − pages = {167--180} | 145 | + pages = {167--180}, | ||
| 146 | + doi = {10.1080/10835547.2008.12090225} | ||||
| 147 | +} | ||||
| 148 | + | ||||
| 149 | +@article{birch2014regression, | ||||
| 150 | + author = {Birch, John W. and Sunderman, Mark A.}, | ||||
| 151 | + title = {Regression Modeling for Vertical and Horizontal Property Tax Inequity}, | ||||
| 152 | + journal = {Journal of Housing Research}, | ||||
| 153 | + year = {2014}, | ||||
| 154 | + volume = {23}, | ||||
| 155 | + number = {1}, | ||||
| 156 | + pages = {89--104}, | ||||
| 157 | + doi = {10.1080/10835547.2013.12092083} | ||||
| 158 | +} | ||||
| 159 | + | ||||
| 160 | +@article{birch2017reducing, | ||||
| 161 | + author = {Birch, John W. and Sunderman, Mark A. and Radetsky, Victor}, | ||||
| 162 | + title = {Reducing Vertical and Horizontal Inequity in Property Tax Assessments}, | ||||
| 163 | + journal = {Journal of Property Tax Assessment \& Administration}, | ||||
| 164 | + year = {2017}, | ||||
| 165 | + volume = {14}, | ||||
| 166 | + number = {2}, | ||||
| 167 | + pages = {71--81}, | ||||
| 168 | + doi = {10.63642/1357-1419.1197} | ||||
| 169 | +} | ||||
| 170 | + | ||||
| 171 | +@article{quintos2020gini, | ||||
| 172 | + author = {Quintos, Carmela}, | ||||
| 173 | + title = {A {Gini} Measure for Vertical Equity in Property Assessments}, | ||||
| 174 | + journal = {Journal of Property Tax Assessment \& Administration}, | ||||
| 175 | + year = {2020}, | ||||
| 176 | + volume = {17}, | ||||
| 177 | + number = {2}, | ||||
| 178 | + doi = {10.63642/1357-1419.1225} | ||||
| 179 | +} | ||||
| 180 | + | ||||
| 181 | +@article{mcmillen2020assessment, | ||||
| 182 | + author = {McMillen, Daniel and Singh, Ruchi}, | ||||
| 183 | + title = {Assessment Regressivity and Property Taxation}, | ||||
| 184 | + journal = {Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics}, | ||||
| 185 | + year = {2020}, | ||||
| 186 | + volume = {60}, | ||||
| 187 | + number = {1--2}, | ||||
| 188 | + pages = {155--169}, | ||||
| 189 | + doi = {10.1007/s11146-019-09715-x} | ||||
| 190 | +} | ||||
| 191 | + | ||||
| 192 | +@article{mcmillen2023measures, | ||||
| 193 | + author = {McMillen, Daniel and Singh, Ruchi}, | ||||
| 194 | + title = {Measures of Vertical Inequality in Assessments}, | ||||
| 195 | + journal = {Journal of Housing Economics}, | ||||
| 196 | + year = {2023}, | ||||
| 197 | + volume = {61}, | ||||
| 198 | + pages = {101950}, | ||||
| 199 | + doi = {10.1016/j.jhe.2023.101950} | ||||
| 200 | +} | ||||
| 201 | + | ||||
| 202 | +@article{mcmillen2026homestead, | ||||
| 203 | + author = {McMillen, Daniel and Singh, Ruchi}, | ||||
| 204 | + title = {Assessment Regressivity and the Homestead Exemption}, | ||||
| 205 | + journal = {National Tax Journal}, | ||||
| 206 | + year = {2026}, | ||||
| 207 | + volume = {79}, | ||||
| 208 | + number = {2}, | ||||
| 209 | + pages = {393--407}, | ||||
| 210 | + doi = {10.1086/740783} | ||||
| 211 | +} | ||||
| 212 | + | ||||
| 213 | +% ------------------------------------------------------------------ evidence on regressivity | ||||
| 214 | +@article{engle1975deassessment, | ||||
| 215 | + author = {Engle, Robert F.}, | ||||
| 216 | + title = {De Facto Discrimination in Residential Assessments: {Boston}}, | ||||
| 217 | + journal = {National Tax Journal}, | ||||
| 218 | + year = {1975}, | ||||
| 219 | + volume = {28}, | ||||
| 220 | + number = {4}, | ||||
| 221 | + pages = {445--451}, | ||||
| 222 | + doi = {10.1086/ntj41863140} | ||||
| 101 | } | 223 | } | ||
| 102 | 224 | ||||
| 103 | @article{mcmillen2008thin, | 225 | @article{mcmillen2008thin, | ||
@@ -107,7 +229,8 @@ | |||||
| 107 | year = {2008}, | 229 | year = {2008}, | ||
| 108 | volume = {61}, | 230 | volume = {61}, | ||
| 109 | number = {4}, | 231 | number = {4}, | ||
| 110 | − pages = {653--671} | 232 | + pages = {653--671}, | ||
| 233 | + doi = {10.17310/ntj.2008.4.05} | ||||
| 111 | } | 234 | } | ||
| 112 | 235 | ||||
| 113 | @article{mcmillen2011assessment, | 236 | @article{mcmillen2011assessment, | ||
@@ -117,7 +240,41 @@ | |||||
| 117 | year = {2011}, | 240 | year = {2011}, | ||
| 118 | volume = {23}, | 241 | volume = {23}, | ||
| 119 | number = {1}, | 242 | number = {1}, | ||
| 120 | − pages = {9--15} | 243 | + pages = {9--15}, | ||
| 244 | + note = {Lincoln Institute of Land Policy} | ||||
| 245 | +} | ||||
| 246 | + | ||||
| 247 | +@article{mcmillen2013appeals, | ||||
| 248 | + author = {McMillen, Daniel P.}, | ||||
| 249 | + title = {The Effect of Appeals on Assessment Ratio Distributions: Some Nonparametric Approaches}, | ||||
| 250 | + journal = {Real Estate Economics}, | ||||
| 251 | + year = {2013}, | ||||
| 252 | + volume = {41}, | ||||
| 253 | + number = {1}, | ||||
| 254 | + pages = {165--191}, | ||||
| 255 | + doi = {10.1111/j.1540-6229.2011.00326.x} | ||||
| 256 | +} | ||||
| 257 | + | ||||
| 258 | +@article{ross2012assessor, | ||||
| 259 | + author = {Ross, Justin M.}, | ||||
| 260 | + title = {Interjurisdictional Determinants of Property Assessment Regressivity}, | ||||
| 261 | + journal = {Land Economics}, | ||||
| 262 | + year = {2012}, | ||||
| 263 | + volume = {88}, | ||||
| 264 | + number = {1}, | ||||
| 265 | + pages = {28--42}, | ||||
| 266 | + doi = {10.3368/le.88.1.28} | ||||
| 267 | +} | ||||
| 268 | + | ||||
| 269 | +@article{plummer2014evidence, | ||||
| 270 | + author = {Plummer, Elizabeth}, | ||||
| 271 | + title = {The Effects of Property Tax Protests on the Assessment Uniformity of Residential Properties}, | ||||
| 272 | + journal = {Real Estate Economics}, | ||||
| 273 | + year = {2014}, | ||||
| 274 | + volume = {42}, | ||||
| 275 | + number = {4}, | ||||
| 276 | + pages = {900--937}, | ||||
| 277 | + doi = {10.1111/1540-6229.12080} | ||||
| 121 | } | 278 | } | ||
| 122 | 279 | ||||
| 123 | @article{hodge2017assessment, | 280 | @article{hodge2017assessment, | ||
@@ -127,27 +284,8 @@ | |||||
| 127 | year = {2017}, | 284 | year = {2017}, | ||
| 128 | volume = {45}, | 285 | volume = {45}, | ||
| 129 | number = {2}, | 286 | number = {2}, | ||
| 130 | − pages = {237--258} | 287 | + pages = {237--258}, | ||
| 131 | −} | 288 | + doi = {10.1111/1540-6229.12126} | ||
| 132 | − | ||||
| 133 | −@article{mcmillen2020assessment, | ||||
| 134 | − author = {McMillen, Daniel and Singh, Ruchi}, | ||||
| 135 | − title = {Assessment Regressivity and Property Taxation}, | ||||
| 136 | − journal = {Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics}, | ||||
| 137 | − year = {2020}, | ||||
| 138 | − volume = {60}, | ||||
| 139 | − number = {1}, | ||||
| 140 | − pages = {155--169} | ||||
| 141 | −} | ||||
| 142 | − | ||||
| 143 | −@article{avenancio2022assessment, | ||||
| 144 | − author = {Avenancio-Le{\'o}n, Carlos F. and Howard, Troup}, | ||||
| 145 | − title = {The Assessment Gap: Racial Inequalities in Property Taxation}, | ||||
| 146 | − journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, | ||||
| 147 | − year = {2022}, | ||||
| 148 | − volume = {137}, | ||||
| 149 | − number = {3}, | ||||
| 150 | − pages = {1383--1434} | ||||
| 151 | } | 289 | } | ||
| 152 | 290 | ||||
| 153 | @techreport{berry2021reassessing, | 291 | @techreport{berry2021reassessing, | ||
@@ -155,7 +293,8 @@ | |||||
| 155 | title = {Reassessing the Property Tax}, | 293 | title = {Reassessing the Property Tax}, | ||
| 156 | institution = {University of Chicago, Harris School of Public Policy}, | 294 | institution = {University of Chicago, Harris School of Public Policy}, | ||
| 157 | type = {Working Paper}, | 295 | type = {Working Paper}, | ||
| 158 | − year = {2021} | 296 | + year = {2021}, | ||
| 297 | + doi = {10.2139/ssrn.3800536} | ||||
| 159 | } | 298 | } | ||
| 160 | 299 | ||||
| 161 | @techreport{amornsiripanitch2022residential, | 300 | @techreport{amornsiripanitch2022residential, | ||
@@ -164,24 +303,98 @@ | |||||
| 164 | institution = {Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia}, | 303 | institution = {Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia}, | ||
| 165 | type = {Working Paper}, | 304 | type = {Working Paper}, | ||
| 166 | number = {22-02}, | 305 | number = {22-02}, | ||
| 167 | − year = {2022} | 306 | + year = {2022}, | ||
| 307 | + doi = {10.21799/frbp.wp.2022.02} | ||||
| 168 | } | 308 | } | ||
| 169 | 309 | ||||
| 170 | −@article{mcmillen2022allocative, | 310 | +@article{avenancio2022assessment, | ||
| 171 | − author = {McMillen, Daniel and Singh, Ruchi}, | 311 | + author = {Avenancio-Le{\'o}n, Carlos F. and Howard, Troup}, | ||
| 172 | − title = {Measures of Vertical Inequality in Assessments}, | 312 | + title = {The Assessment Gap: Racial Inequalities in Property Taxation}, | ||
| 173 | − journal = {Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics}, | 313 | + journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, | ||
| 174 | year = {2022}, | 314 | year = {2022}, | ||
| 175 | − volume = {online first}, | 315 | + volume = {137}, | ||
| 176 | − pages = {1--29} | 316 | + number = {3}, | ||
| 317 | + pages = {1383--1434}, | ||||
| 318 | + doi = {10.1093/qje/qjac009} | ||||
| 177 | } | 319 | } | ||
| 178 | 320 | ||||
| 321 | +@article{ihlanfeldt2022homestead, | ||||
| 322 | + author = {Ihlanfeldt, Keith and Rodgers, Luke P.}, | ||||
| 323 | + title = {Homestead Exemptions, Heterogeneous Assessment, and Property Tax Progressivity}, | ||||
| 324 | + journal = {National Tax Journal}, | ||||
| 325 | + year = {2022}, | ||||
| 326 | + volume = {75}, | ||||
| 327 | + number = {1}, | ||||
| 328 | + pages = {7--31}, | ||||
| 329 | + doi = {10.1086/717587} | ||||
| 330 | +} | ||||
| 331 | + | ||||
| 332 | +% ------------------------------------------------------------------ Canada | ||||
| 333 | +@article{harris2001social, | ||||
| 334 | + author = {Harris, Richard and Lehman, Michael}, | ||||
| 335 | + title = {Social and Geographic Inequities in the Residential Property Tax: A Review and Case Study}, | ||||
| 336 | + journal = {Environment and Planning A}, | ||||
| 337 | + year = {2001}, | ||||
| 338 | + volume = {33}, | ||||
| 339 | + number = {5}, | ||||
| 340 | + pages = {881--900}, | ||||
| 341 | + doi = {10.1068/a33128} | ||||
| 342 | +} | ||||
| 343 | + | ||||
| 344 | +@book{bird2012tale, | ||||
| 345 | + author = {Bird, Richard M. and Slack, Enid and Tassonyi, Almos}, | ||||
| 346 | + title = {A Tale of Two Taxes: Property Tax Reform in {Ontario}}, | ||||
| 347 | + publisher = {Lincoln Institute of Land Policy}, | ||||
| 348 | + address = {Cambridge, MA}, | ||||
| 349 | + year = {2012}, | ||||
| 350 | + isbn = {978-1-55844-225-2} | ||||
| 351 | +} | ||||
| 352 | + | ||||
| 353 | +@article{carbonnier2024property, | ||||
| 354 | + author = {Carbonnier, Cl{\'e}ment}, | ||||
| 355 | + title = {Property Tax Regressivity, the Case of {Qu{\'e}bec}}, | ||||
| 356 | + journal = {Public Finance Review}, | ||||
| 357 | + year = {2024}, | ||||
| 358 | + volume = {52}, | ||||
| 359 | + number = {2}, | ||||
| 360 | + pages = {155--181}, | ||||
| 361 | + doi = {10.1177/10911421231212354} | ||||
| 362 | +} | ||||
| 363 | + | ||||
| 364 | +@misc{lfm2026, | ||||
| 365 | + author = {{Gouvernement du Qu\'ebec}}, | ||||
| 366 | + title = {Loi sur la fiscalit\'e municipale, {RLRQ}, c.\ {F-2.1}}, | ||||
| 367 | + howpublished = {L\'egisQu\'ebec, consolidated text consulted 17 October 2026, \url{https://www.legisquebec.gouv.qc.ca/fr/document/lc/F-2.1}}, | ||||
| 368 | + year = {2026}, | ||||
| 369 | + note = {Articles 5, 14, 14.2, 46, 72, 124, 244.29--244.30, 253.27 and 264} | ||||
| 370 | +} | ||||
| 371 | + | ||||
| 372 | +@misc{mamh2024manuel, | ||||
| 373 | + author = {{Minist\`ere des Affaires municipales et de l'Habitation}}, | ||||
| 374 | + title = {Manuel d'\'evaluation fonci\`ere du {Qu\'ebec}}, | ||||
| 375 | + howpublished = {Gouvernement du Qu\'ebec, Qu\'ebec}, | ||||
| 376 | + year = {2024} | ||||
| 377 | +} | ||||
| 378 | + | ||||
| 379 | +% ------------------------------------------------------------------ standards and manuals | ||||
| 179 | @book{iaao2013standard, | 380 | @book{iaao2013standard, | ||
| 180 | author = {{International Association of Assessing Officers}}, | 381 | author = {{International Association of Assessing Officers}}, | ||
| 181 | title = {Standard on Ratio Studies}, | 382 | title = {Standard on Ratio Studies}, | ||
| 182 | publisher = {IAAO}, | 383 | publisher = {IAAO}, | ||
| 183 | address = {Kansas City, MO}, | 384 | address = {Kansas City, MO}, | ||
| 184 | − year = {2013} | 385 | + year = {2013}, | ||
| 386 | + note = {Approved April 2013} | ||||
| 387 | +} | ||||
| 388 | + | ||||
| 389 | +@article{gloudemans2011prb, | ||||
| 390 | + author = {Gloudemans, Robert J.}, | ||||
| 391 | + title = {The Coefficient of Price-Related Bias: A Measure of Vertical Equity}, | ||||
| 392 | + journal = {Fair \& Equitable}, | ||||
| 393 | + year = {2011}, | ||||
| 394 | + volume = {9}, | ||||
| 395 | + number = {8}, | ||||
| 396 | + pages = {3--8}, | ||||
| 397 | + note = {International Association of Assessing Officers} | ||||
| 185 | } | 398 | } | ||
| 186 | 399 | ||||
| 187 | @book{eckert1990property, | 400 | @book{eckert1990property, | ||
@@ -200,6 +413,63 @@ | |||||
| 200 | year = {2011} | 413 | year = {2011} | ||
| 201 | } | 414 | } | ||
| 202 | 415 | ||||
| 416 | +% ------------------------------------------------------------------ econometrics | ||||
| 417 | +@article{klepper1984consistent, | ||||
| 418 | + author = {Klepper, Steven and Leamer, Edward E.}, | ||||
| 419 | + title = {Consistent Sets of Estimates for Regressions with Errors in All Variables}, | ||||
| 420 | + journal = {Econometrica}, | ||||
| 421 | + year = {1984}, | ||||
| 422 | + volume = {52}, | ||||
| 423 | + number = {1}, | ||||
| 424 | + pages = {163--183}, | ||||
| 425 | + doi = {10.2307/1911466} | ||||
| 426 | +} | ||||
| 427 | + | ||||
| 428 | +@article{griliches1986errors, | ||||
| 429 | + author = {Griliches, Zvi and Hausman, Jerry A.}, | ||||
| 430 | + title = {Errors in Variables in Panel Data}, | ||||
| 431 | + journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, | ||||
| 432 | + year = {1986}, | ||||
| 433 | + volume = {31}, | ||||
| 434 | + number = {1}, | ||||
| 435 | + pages = {93--118}, | ||||
| 436 | + doi = {10.1016/0304-4076(86)90058-8} | ||||
| 437 | +} | ||||
| 438 | + | ||||
| 439 | +@article{koenker1978regression, | ||||
| 440 | + author = {Koenker, Roger and Bassett, Gilbert}, | ||||
| 441 | + title = {Regression Quantiles}, | ||||
| 442 | + journal = {Econometrica}, | ||||
| 443 | + year = {1978}, | ||||
| 444 | + volume = {46}, | ||||
| 445 | + number = {1}, | ||||
| 446 | + pages = {33--50}, | ||||
| 447 | + doi = {10.2307/1913643} | ||||
| 448 | +} | ||||
| 449 | + | ||||
| 450 | +@article{cameron2015practitioner, | ||||
| 451 | + author = {Cameron, A. Colin and Miller, Douglas L.}, | ||||
| 452 | + title = {A Practitioner's Guide to Cluster-Robust Inference}, | ||||
| 453 | + journal = {Journal of Human Resources}, | ||||
| 454 | + year = {2015}, | ||||
| 455 | + volume = {50}, | ||||
| 456 | + number = {2}, | ||||
| 457 | + pages = {317--372}, | ||||
| 458 | + doi = {10.3368/jhr.50.2.317} | ||||
| 459 | +} | ||||
| 460 | + | ||||
| 461 | +@article{abadie2023clustering, | ||||
| 462 | + author = {Abadie, Alberto and Athey, Susan and Imbens, Guido W. and Wooldridge, Jeffrey M.}, | ||||
| 463 | + title = {When Should You Adjust Standard Errors for Clustering?}, | ||||
| 464 | + journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, | ||||
| 465 | + year = {2023}, | ||||
| 466 | + volume = {138}, | ||||
| 467 | + number = {1}, | ||||
| 468 | + pages = {1--35}, | ||||
| 469 | + doi = {10.1093/qje/qjac038} | ||||
| 470 | +} | ||||
| 471 | + | ||||
| 472 | +% ------------------------------------------------------------------ incidence and hedonics | ||||
| 203 | @article{oates1969effects, | 473 | @article{oates1969effects, | ||
| 204 | author = {Oates, Wallace E.}, | 474 | author = {Oates, Wallace E.}, | ||
| 205 | title = {The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the {Tiebout} Hypothesis}, | 475 | title = {The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the {Tiebout} Hypothesis}, | ||
@@ -207,7 +477,8 @@ | |||||
| 207 | year = {1969}, | 477 | year = {1969}, | ||
| 208 | volume = {77}, | 478 | volume = {77}, | ||
| 209 | number = {6}, | 479 | number = {6}, | ||
| 210 | − pages = {957--971} | 480 | + pages = {957--971}, | ||
| 481 | + doi = {10.1086/259584} | ||||
| 211 | } | 482 | } | ||
| 212 | 483 | ||||
| 213 | @article{oates2016local, | 484 | @article{oates2016local, | ||
@@ -217,7 +488,8 @@ | |||||
| 217 | year = {2016}, | 488 | year = {2016}, | ||
| 218 | volume = {69}, | 489 | volume = {69}, | ||
| 219 | number = {2}, | 490 | number = {2}, | ||
| 220 | − pages = {415--434} | 491 | + pages = {415--433}, | ||
| 492 | + doi = {10.1086/ntj44014529} | ||||
| 221 | } | 493 | } | ||
| 222 | 494 | ||||
| 223 | @article{rosen1974hedonic, | 495 | @article{rosen1974hedonic, | ||
@@ -227,7 +499,8 @@ | |||||
| 227 | year = {1974}, | 499 | year = {1974}, | ||
| 228 | volume = {82}, | 500 | volume = {82}, | ||
| 229 | number = {1}, | 501 | number = {1}, | ||
| 230 | − pages = {34--55} | 502 | + pages = {34--55}, | ||
| 503 | + doi = {10.1086/260169} | ||||
| 231 | } | 504 | } | ||
| 232 | 505 | ||||
| 233 | @incollection{malpezzi2003hedonic, | 506 | @incollection{malpezzi2003hedonic, | ||
@@ -238,117 +511,8 @@ | |||||
| 238 | publisher = {Blackwell}, | 511 | publisher = {Blackwell}, | ||
| 239 | address = {Oxford}, | 512 | address = {Oxford}, | ||
| 240 | year = {2003}, | 513 | year = {2003}, | ||
| 241 | − pages = {67--89} | 514 | + pages = {67--89}, | ||
| 242 | −} | 515 | + doi = {10.1002/9780470690680.ch5} | ||
| 243 | − | ||||
| 244 | −@article{carbonnier2024property, | ||||
| 245 | − author = {Carbonnier, Cl{\'e}ment}, | ||||
| 246 | − title = {Property Tax Regressivity, the Case of {Qu{\'e}bec}}, | ||||
| 247 | − journal = {Public Finance Review}, | ||||
| 248 | − year = {2024}, | ||||
| 249 | − volume = {52}, | ||||
| 250 | − number = {2}, | ||||
| 251 | − pages = {155--181} | ||||
| 252 | −} | ||||
| 253 | − | ||||
| 254 | −@techreport{slack2014political, | ||||
| 255 | − author = {Slack, Enid and Bird, Richard M.}, | ||||
| 256 | − title = {The Political Economy of Property Tax Reform}, | ||||
| 257 | − institution = {OECD}, | ||||
| 258 | − type = {OECD Working Papers on Fiscal Federalism}, | ||||
| 259 | − number = {18}, | ||||
| 260 | − year = {2014} | ||||
| 261 | −} | ||||
| 262 | − | ||||
| 263 | −@book{youngman2016good, | ||||
| 264 | − author = {Youngman, Joan}, | ||||
| 265 | − title = {A Good Tax: Legal and Policy Issues for the Property Tax in the {United States}}, | ||||
| 266 | − publisher = {Lincoln Institute of Land Policy}, | ||||
| 267 | − address = {Cambridge, MA}, | ||||
| 268 | − year = {2016} | ||||
| 269 | −} | ||||
| 270 | − | ||||
| 271 | −@techreport{found2017property, | ||||
| 272 | − author = {Found, Adam and Tomlinson, Peter}, | ||||
| 273 | − title = {Business Tax Burdens in {Canada's} Major Cities: The 2017 Report Card}, | ||||
| 274 | − institution = {C.D. Howe Institute}, | ||||
| 275 | − type = {E-Brief}, | ||||
| 276 | − year = {2017} | ||||
| 277 | −} | ||||
| 278 | − | ||||
| 279 | −@techreport{mpac2022vertical, | ||||
| 280 | − author = {{Municipal Property Assessment Corporation}}, | ||||
| 281 | − title = {Vertical Equity Review of Residential Assessed Values}, | ||||
| 282 | − institution = {MPAC}, | ||||
| 283 | − address = {Toronto}, | ||||
| 284 | − type = {Technical Report}, | ||||
| 285 | − year = {2022} | ||||
| 286 | −} | ||||
| 287 | − | ||||
| 288 | −@article{goolsby1997assessment, | ||||
| 289 | − author = {Goolsby, William C.}, | ||||
| 290 | − title = {Assessment Error in the Valuation of Owner-Occupied Housing}, | ||||
| 291 | − journal = {Journal of Real Estate Research}, | ||||
| 292 | − year = {1997}, | ||||
| 293 | − volume = {13}, | ||||
| 294 | − number = {1}, | ||||
| 295 | − pages = {33--45} | ||||
| 296 | −} | ||||
| 297 | − | ||||
| 298 | −@article{quintos2020prb, | ||||
| 299 | − author = {Quintos, Carmela}, | ||||
| 300 | − title = {A Gradient Boosting Approach to Understanding Vertical and Horizontal Inequity in Property Assessments}, | ||||
| 301 | − journal = {Journal of Property Tax Assessment \& Administration}, | ||||
| 302 | − year = {2020}, | ||||
| 303 | − volume = {17}, | ||||
| 304 | − number = {2}, | ||||
| 305 | − pages = {1--28} | ||||
| 306 | −} | ||||
| 307 | − | ||||
| 308 | −@article{ross2012assessor, | ||||
| 309 | − author = {Ross, Justin M.}, | ||||
| 310 | − title = {Interjurisdictional Determinants of Property Assessment Regressivity}, | ||||
| 311 | − journal = {Land Economics}, | ||||
| 312 | − year = {2012}, | ||||
| 313 | − volume = {88}, | ||||
| 314 | − number = {1}, | ||||
| 315 | − pages = {28--42} | ||||
| 316 | −} | ||||
| 317 | − | ||||
| 318 | −@article{plummer2014evidence, | ||||
| 319 | − author = {Plummer, Elizabeth}, | ||||
| 320 | − title = {The Effects of Property Tax Protests on the Assessment Uniformity of Residential Properties}, | ||||
| 321 | − journal = {Real Estate Economics}, | ||||
| 322 | − year = {2014}, | ||||
| 323 | − volume = {42}, | ||||
| 324 | − number = {4}, | ||||
| 325 | − pages = {900--937} | ||||
| 326 | −} | ||||
| 327 | − | ||||
| 328 | −@article{clapp1990methods, | ||||
| 329 | − author = {Clapp, John M.}, | ||||
| 330 | − title = {A Methodology for Constructing Vacant Land Price Indices}, | ||||
| 331 | − journal = {Real Estate Economics}, | ||||
| 332 | − year = {1990}, | ||||
| 333 | − volume = {18}, | ||||
| 334 | − number = {3}, | ||||
| 335 | − pages = {274--293} | ||||
| 336 | −} | ||||
| 337 | − | ||||
| 338 | −@misc{lfm2026, | ||||
| 339 | − author = {{Gouvernement du Qu\'ebec}}, | ||||
| 340 | − title = {Loi sur la fiscalit\'e municipale, {RLRQ}, c.\ {F-2.1}}, | ||||
| 341 | − howpublished = {L\'egisQu\'ebec}, | ||||
| 342 | − year = {2026}, | ||||
| 343 | − note = {Articles 42--46 (triennial rolls and market-condition reference date)} | ||||
| 344 | −} | ||||
| 345 | − | ||||
| 346 | −@misc{mamh2024manuel, | ||||
| 347 | − author = {{Minist\`ere des Affaires municipales et de l'Habitation}}, | ||||
| 348 | − title = {Manuel d'\'evaluation fonci\`ere du {Qu\'ebec}}, | ||||
| 349 | − howpublished = {Gouvernement du Qu\'ebec}, | ||||
| 350 | − address = {Qu\'ebec}, | ||||
| 351 | − year = {2024} | ||||
| 352 | } | 516 | } | ||
| 353 | 517 | ||||
| 354 | @article{desrosiers2000hedonic, | 518 | @article{desrosiers2000hedonic, | ||
@@ -358,7 +522,8 @@ | |||||
| 358 | year = {2000}, | 522 | year = {2000}, | ||
| 359 | volume = {18}, | 523 | volume = {18}, | ||
| 360 | number = {3}, | 524 | number = {3}, | ||
| 361 | − pages = {291--315} | 525 | + pages = {291--315}, | ||
| 526 | + doi = {10.1108/14635780010338245} | ||||
| 362 | } | 527 | } | ||
| 363 | 528 | ||||
| 364 | @article{bostic2007land, | 529 | @article{bostic2007land, | ||
@@ -368,35 +533,16 @@ | |||||
| 368 | year = {2007}, | 533 | year = {2007}, | ||
| 369 | volume = {35}, | 534 | volume = {35}, | ||
| 370 | number = {2}, | 535 | number = {2}, | ||
| 371 | − pages = {183--208} | 536 | + pages = {183--208}, | ||
| 372 | −} | 537 | + doi = {10.1111/j.1540-6229.2007.00187.x} | ||
| 373 | − | ||||
| 374 | −@article{ihlanfeldt2023appraisal, | ||||
| 375 | − author = {Ihlanfeldt, Keith and Rodgers, Luke P.}, | ||||
| 376 | − title = {Homestead Exemptions, Heterogeneous Assessment, and Property Tax Progressivity}, | ||||
| 377 | − journal = {National Tax Journal}, | ||||
| 378 | − year = {2022}, | ||||
| 379 | − volume = {75}, | ||||
| 380 | − number = {1}, | ||||
| 381 | − pages = {7--31} | ||||
| 382 | } | 538 | } | ||
| 383 | 539 | ||||
| 384 | −@article{baar1981property, | 540 | +@techreport{slack2014political, | ||
| 385 | − author = {Baar, Kenneth K.}, | 541 | + author = {Slack, Enid and Bird, Richard M.}, | ||
| 386 | − title = {Property Tax Assessment Discrimination Against Low-Income Neighborhoods}, | 542 | + title = {The Political Economy of Property Tax Reform}, | ||
| 387 | − journal = {The Urban Lawyer}, | 543 | + institution = {OECD}, | ||
| 388 | − year = {1981}, | 544 | + type = {OECD Working Papers on Fiscal Federalism}, | ||
| 389 | − volume = {13}, | 545 | + number = {18}, | ||
| 390 | − number = {3}, | 546 | + year = {2014}, | ||
| 391 | − pages = {333--406} | 547 | + doi = {10.1787/5jz5pzvzv6r7-en} | ||
| 392 | −} | ||||
| 393 | − | ||||
| 394 | −@article{engle1975deassessment, | ||||
| 395 | − author = {Engle, Robert F.}, | ||||
| 396 | − title = {De Facto Discrimination in Residential Assessments: {Boston}}, | ||||
| 397 | − journal = {National Tax Journal}, | ||||
| 398 | − year = {1975}, | ||||
| 399 | − volume = {28}, | ||||
| 400 | − number = {4}, | ||||
| 401 | − pages = {445--451} | ||||
| 402 | } | 548 | } | ||
modified
paper/sections/conclusion.tex
+47 −26
@@ -4,34 +4,55 @@ | |||||
| 4 | \label{sec:concl} | 4 | \label{sec:concl} | ||
| 5 | 5 | ||||
| 6 | Matching more than half a million residential sales to the assessment | 6 | Matching more than half a million residential sales to the assessment | ||
| 7 | −rolls that tax them, this paper delivers the first province-wide audit of | 7 | +rolls that tax them, this paper delivers the first province-wide ratio | ||
| 8 | −assessment equity in Canada. The verdict is unambiguous. Quebec's | 8 | +study of assessment equity for a Canadian province. The answer to the | ||
| 9 | −property-tax base is systematically regressive: within the same | 9 | +question it set out to ask---is Quebec's property-tax base | ||
| 10 | −municipality, roll and year, the assessment ratio falls by 34\% per | 10 | +regressive?---turns out to depend on a choice that ratio-study practice | ||
| 11 | −log-point of price in the descriptive fixed-effects estimate, and by 8\% | 11 | +regulates and that the academic literature rarely reports: how to treat | ||
| 12 | −under the most conservative measurement-error correction available. | 12 | +the sales whose declared price lies far below the rolled value. Under a | ||
| 13 | −Ninety-five percent of municipalities fail the IAAO vertical-equity | 13 | +lenient trim, Quebec looks like the regressive U.S.\ jurisdictions of the | ||
| 14 | −standard, ninety-nine percent fail its uniformity standard, and the median | 14 | +recent literature: a within-market elasticity of the assessment ratio of | ||
| 15 | −dwelling in the bottom local price decile pays roughly two thirds more | 15 | +$-0.34$, a COD near 30, and 95\% of municipalities outside the IAAO band | ||
| 16 | −property tax than uniform assessment would imply, while the top decile | 16 | +for price-related bias. Under the outlier rule the IAAO standard | ||
| 17 | −pays less. The inequity concentrates where mass appraisal is hardest --- | 17 | +prescribes, which removes 9\% of sales concentrated in the bottom price | ||
| 18 | −old houses, plexes, land-heavy and luxury properties, thin markets --- | 18 | +decile, Quebec looks like a system that works: an elasticity of $-0.09$ | ||
| 19 | −doubles when triennial rolls fall behind a booming market, and disappears | 19 | +that a measurement-error-robust instrument brings to zero, a PRB inside | ||
| 20 | −almost nowhere except Montr\'eal. | 20 | +the acceptable band, CODs between 9 and 12 in the ten largest cities, and | ||
| 21 | +three quarters of municipalities meeting the vertical-equity standard. | ||||
| 22 | +Proportionality holds across the upper 80\% of every market's price | ||||
| 23 | +distribution under either treatment; the two readings differ only about | ||||
| 24 | +the bottom quintile, and the registry does not record what would settle | ||||
| 25 | +the difference. | ||||
| 21 | 26 | ||||
| 22 | −These findings reframe the presumption that centralized, professionally | 27 | +Within those bounds, three results are robust. The ordering of difficulty | ||
| 23 | −regulated assessment systems are immune to the pathologies documented in | 28 | +is invariant to the trimming rule: condominiums are assessed | ||
| 24 | −the fragmented U.S. system. Quebec has uniform statutes, certified | 29 | +proportionally, while single-family homes, plexes, older and land-heavy | ||
| 25 | −evaluators and statutory market-vintage synchronization --- and produces | 30 | +properties and small municipalities are regressive, at a quarter of the | ||
| 26 | −regressivity of U.S. magnitude anyway. The binding constraint is not | 31 | +lenient-trim magnitude once outliers are removed. Staleness widens | ||
| 27 | −governance but valuation technology and revaluation frequency, which is | 32 | +price-related bias at the margin in fast markets---the within-municipality | ||
| 28 | −in fact encouraging: cycle length, pooled assessment services and | 33 | +PRB of the trimmed sample moves from $-0.04$ in 2021--2022 to zero from | ||
| 29 | −vertical audit standards are policy variables, and inexpensive ones | 34 | +2024---but does not generate inequity, and the province-wide swing that | ||
| 30 | −relative to the redistribution at stake. | 35 | +suggested otherwise is compositional. And the redistribution implied by | ||
| 36 | +the most defensible conventions is real but modest: the cheapest tenth of | ||||
| 37 | +dwellings in a market pays about 5--7\% more property tax than uniform | ||||
| 38 | +assessment would imply, the most expensive tenth 3--5\% less. | ||||
| 39 | + | ||||
| 40 | +These findings qualify the presumption, in both directions, about | ||||
| 41 | +centralised assessment systems. Quebec's uniform statutes, chartered | ||||
| 42 | +appraisers and statutory market-vintage synchronisation do not immunise | ||||
| 43 | +it against the pathologies of the fragmented U.S.\ system, but neither do | ||||
| 44 | +they reproduce them at U.S.\ magnitude once sales are screened as the | ||||
| 45 | +profession prescribes. The binding constraint the audit reveals is | ||||
| 46 | +informational: the province measures assessment \emph{level} every year | ||||
| 47 | +and publishes nothing on uniformity or vertical equity, and its transaction | ||||
| 48 | +records carry no indication of whether a sale was at arm's length. Both | ||||
| 49 | +are inexpensive to fix relative to the redistribution at stake, and fixing | ||||
| 50 | +the second would turn the bounds of this paper into a point. | ||||
| 31 | 51 | ||||
| 32 | The matched sale--roll architecture built here supports a research agenda | 52 | The matched sale--roll architecture built here supports a research agenda | ||
| 33 | beyond this audit: linking assessment gaps to neighbourhood | 53 | beyond this audit: linking assessment gaps to neighbourhood | ||
| 34 | socio-demographics, exploiting the discrete arrival of new rolls to study | 54 | socio-demographics, exploiting the discrete arrival of new rolls to study | ||
| 35 | −price anchoring, and using the land--building decomposition to measure | 55 | +price anchoring, using the land--building decomposition to measure | ||
| 36 | −land-value dynamics at the parcel level. We pursue these in companion | 56 | +land-value dynamics at the parcel level, and, once validated sale flags | ||
| 37 | −work. | 57 | +become available, revisiting the bottom quintile that this paper could | ||
| 58 | +only bracket. | ||||
modified
paper/sections/data.tex
+73 −42
@@ -9,40 +9,45 @@ We start from a compiled registry of 745{,}119 residential-market | |||||
| 9 | transactions recorded in Quebec between January 2021 and July 2026, each | 9 | transactions recorded in Quebec between January 2021 and July 2026, each | ||
| 10 | carrying the sale price, sale date, civic address, geographic coordinates, | 10 | carrying the sale price, sale date, civic address, geographic coordinates, | ||
| 11 | and a listing-derived property type. Each transaction has been matched at | 11 | and a listing-derived property type. Each transaction has been matched at | ||
| 12 | −the parcel level to the municipal assessment roll in force on the sale date. | 12 | +the parcel level to the municipal assessment roll in force on the sale | ||
| 13 | −The match keys on geographic proximity between the transaction's coordinates | 13 | +date. The match keys on geographic proximity between the transaction's | ||
| 14 | −and the roll unit's coordinates and is validated against the roll's recorded | 14 | +coordinates and the roll unit's coordinates and is validated against the | ||
| 15 | −value; a composite score (maximum 220) summarizes the quality of the | 15 | +roll's recorded value; a composite score (maximum 220) summarises the | ||
| 16 | −address, distance and value agreement. Matches are extremely tight: the | 16 | +quality of the address, distance and value agreement. Matches are tight: | ||
| 17 | −median distance between the transaction and the matched roll unit is | 17 | +the median distance between the transaction and the matched roll unit is | ||
| 18 | 0.6~metres, and every observation retained in the estimation sample | 18 | 0.6~metres, and every observation retained in the estimation sample | ||
| 19 | reproduces the roll's assessed value exactly. | 19 | reproduces the roll's assessed value exactly. | ||
| 20 | 20 | ||||
| 21 | −From the roll we observe the taxable value of the property | 21 | +From the roll we observe the taxable value of the property ($AV$, | ||
| 22 | −($AV$, \texttt{valeur immeuble}), its land and building components, lot | 22 | +\texttt{valeur immeuble}), its land and building components, lot area, | ||
| 23 | −area, total floor area, year of construction, number of dwelling units, the | 23 | +total floor area, year of construction, number of dwelling units, the | ||
| 24 | −standardized use code (CUBF), the roll vintage, and the statutory | 24 | +standardised use code (CUBF), the roll vintage, and the statutory | ||
| 25 | −market-condition reference date discussed in Section~\ref{sec:inst}. | 25 | +market-condition reference date discussed in Section~\ref{sec:inst}. The | ||
| 26 | +registry does not record whether a transaction was at arm's length. | ||||
| 26 | 27 | ||||
| 27 | \subsection{Sample restrictions} | 28 | \subsection{Sample restrictions} | ||
| 28 | 29 | ||||
| 29 | Table~\ref{tab:sumstats} describes the estimation sample; the selection | 30 | Table~\ref{tab:sumstats} describes the estimation sample; the selection | ||
| 30 | −cascade is as follows. We keep sales of residential use codes --- | 31 | +cascade is as follows. We keep sales of residential use codes---dwellings | ||
| 31 | −dwellings (CUBF 1000), cottages (1100), mobile homes (1211) and other | 32 | +(CUBF 1000), cottages (1100), mobile homes (1211) and other residential | ||
| 32 | −residential (1990) --- which removes vacant land, commercial property and | 33 | +(1990)---which removes vacant land, commercial property and | ||
| 33 | −construction-in-progress (672{,}276 sales remain). We require a | 34 | +construction in progress (672{,}276 sales remain). We require a | ||
| 34 | high-confidence roll match (distance $\le 50$~m and score $\ge 150$; | 35 | high-confidence roll match (distance $\le 50$~m and score $\ge 150$; | ||
| 35 | 568{,}711 sales), a positive assessed value and a price of at least | 36 | 568{,}711 sales), a positive assessed value and a price of at least | ||
| 36 | −\$50{,}000 --- the floor of the source registry, which also screens out | 37 | +\$50{,}000, the floor of the source registry. Assessment ratios | ||
| 37 | −most non-arm's-length transfers. Assessment ratios $r_i = AV_i/SP_i$ are | 38 | +$r_i = AV_i/SP_i$ are then trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles | ||
| 38 | −trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles \emph{within each roll vintage}, so | 39 | +\emph{within each roll vintage}, so that the mechanical drift of ratio | ||
| 39 | −that the mechanical drift of ratio levels across vintages is not trimmed | 40 | +levels across vintages is not trimmed asymmetrically (557{,}325 sales). | ||
| 40 | −asymmetrically (557{,}325 sales). Finally, since all estimates compare | 41 | +Finally, since all estimates compare sales within a municipality | ||
| 41 | −sales within a municipality $\times$ roll $\times$ sale-year block | 42 | +$\times$ roll $\times$ sale-year block (``cell''), we require at least 20 | ||
| 42 | −(``cell''), we require at least 20 sales per cell. The estimation sample | 43 | +sales per cell. The estimation sample contains \textbf{522{,}769 sales} in | ||
| 43 | −contains \textbf{522{,}769 sales} in 625 municipalities and 2{,}884 cells: | 44 | +625 municipalities and 2{,}884 cells: 345{,}053 single-family homes, | ||
| 44 | −345{,}053 single-family homes, 81{,}693 plexes (2--5 units), 81{,}461 | 45 | +81{,}693 plexes (2--5 units), 81{,}461 condominiums, 9{,}287 cottages, | ||
| 45 | −condominiums, 9{,}287 cottages and 4{,}701 mobile homes. | 46 | +4{,}701 mobile homes and 574 other residential units. Because rolls enter | ||
| 47 | +into force on January~1, a municipality--year almost always falls under a | ||||
| 48 | +single roll; 85 of the 2{,}798 municipality--years in the sample span two | ||||
| 49 | +rolls (late deposits and extensions), which is why cells are defined on the | ||||
| 50 | +roll vintage as well as on the year. | ||||
| 46 | 51 | ||||
| 47 | \begin{table}[t] | 52 | \begin{table}[t] | ||
| 48 | \centering | 53 | \centering | ||
@@ -56,12 +61,38 @@ condominiums, 9{,}287 cottages and 4{,}701 mobile homes. | |||||
| 56 | 2026, matched at the parcel level to the assessment roll in force at the | 61 | 2026, matched at the parcel level to the assessment roll in force at the | ||
| 57 | sale date. The assessment ratio is assessed value divided by sale price. | 62 | sale date. The assessment ratio is assessed value divided by sale price. | ||
| 58 | Roll lag is the number of months between the roll's statutory | 63 | Roll lag is the number of months between the roll's statutory | ||
| 59 | −market-condition reference date (July 1) and the sale date. The assessed | 64 | +market-condition reference date (July~1) and the sale date. The assessed | ||
| 60 | land share is the roll's land value divided by total assessed value. | 65 | land share is the roll's land value divided by total assessed value. | ||
| 61 | \end{tablenotes} | 66 | \end{tablenotes} | ||
| 62 | \end{threeparttable} | 67 | \end{threeparttable} | ||
| 63 | \end{table} | 68 | \end{table} | ||
| 64 | 69 | ||||
| 70 | +\subsection{Two treatments of extreme ratios} | ||||
| 71 | +\label{sec:trim} | ||||
| 72 | + | ||||
| 73 | +The 1/99 trim within vintage is deliberately lenient: it discards sales | ||||
| 74 | +whose ratio is implausible for the market as a whole but retains, inside | ||||
| 75 | +each municipality, every ratio that is implausible for that market. The | ||||
| 76 | +retained distribution has a long upper tail---6.1\% of sales have a ratio | ||||
| 77 | +above 1.5 and 3.2\% above 2, that is, a declared price below half the | ||||
| 78 | +rolled value in a period when the typical dwelling sold for 28\% more than | ||||
| 79 | +its assessment. The IAAO standard treats such observations differently. | ||||
| 80 | +Its Appendix~B identifies as outliers the ratios that lie more than 1.5 | ||||
| 81 | +interquartile ranges beyond the first and third quartiles of the stratum, | ||||
| 82 | +requires that they be scrutinised and trimmed within documented limits | ||||
| 83 | +(5 to 10\% of a large, unvalidated sample), and warns that statistics from | ||||
| 84 | +trimmed and untrimmed distributions are not comparable | ||||
| 85 | +\citep{iaao2013standard}. Applied within each cell, the rule flags 9.2\% of | ||||
| 86 | +our sales. The flagged sales are not spread evenly: 53\% of the sales in | ||||
| 87 | +the bottom within-cell price decile are outliers, 16\% in the second | ||||
| 88 | +decile, and fewer than 5\% in every decile above the fourth | ||||
| 89 | +(Table~\ref{tab:taxshiftalt}). Whether they are market sales of severely | ||||
| 90 | +over-assessed homes or non-market transfers recorded at nominal prices | ||||
| 91 | +cannot be determined from the registry. We therefore carry both treatments | ||||
| 92 | +through the paper: the \emph{baseline} (lenient-trim) sample of 522{,}769 | ||||
| 93 | +sales, and the \emph{IAAO-trimmed} sample of 471{,}148 sales, and we report | ||||
| 94 | +a grid of intermediate rules in Section~\ref{sec:trimres}. | ||||
| 95 | + | ||||
| 65 | \subsection{The raw pattern} | 96 | \subsection{The raw pattern} | ||
| 66 | 97 | ||||
| 67 | The median assessment ratio is 0.78: the typical dwelling sells for about | 98 | The median assessment ratio is 0.78: the typical dwelling sells for about | ||
@@ -69,21 +100,20 @@ The median assessment ratio is 0.78: the typical dwelling sells for about | |||||
| 69 | back-dated rolls. Figure~\ref{fig:ratiodist} shows the distribution and its | 100 | back-dated rolls. Figure~\ref{fig:ratiodist} shows the distribution and its | ||
| 70 | decomposition by roll lag: sales occurring within two years of the | 101 | decomposition by roll lag: sales occurring within two years of the | ||
| 71 | reference date centre near 0.87, while sales more than four years out | 102 | reference date centre near 0.87, while sales more than four years out | ||
| 72 | −centre near 0.64 --- the mechanical staleness gradient that our fixed | 103 | +centre near 0.64---the staleness gradient that our fixed effects absorb. | ||
| 73 | −effects absorb. Figure~\ref{fig:time} traces the same mechanics in | 104 | +Figure~\ref{fig:time} traces the same mechanics in calendar time: each roll | ||
| 74 | −calendar time: each roll vintage enters near parity with the market it was | 105 | +vintage enters near parity with the market it was referenced on, then | ||
| 75 | −referenced on, then drifts down as prices rise, and the 2022--2023 rate | 106 | +drifts down as prices rise, and the 2022--2023 rate shock is visible as a | ||
| 76 | −shock is visible as a flattening of the drift. Everything that follows | 107 | +flattening of the drift. Everything that follows nets out this timing | ||
| 77 | −nets out this timing structure and asks a sharper question: \emph{within} a | 108 | +structure and asks a sharper question: \emph{within} a given municipality, | ||
| 78 | −given municipality, roll, and year, do cheap and expensive homes face the | 109 | +roll and year, do cheap and expensive homes face the same ratio? | ||
| 79 | −same ratio? | ||||
| 80 | 110 | ||||
| 81 | \begin{figure}[t] | 111 | \begin{figure}[t] | ||
| 82 | \centering | 112 | \centering | ||
| 83 | \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig_ratio_dist.png} | 113 | \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig_ratio_dist.png} | ||
| 84 | −\caption{Assessment ratios. Panel A: distribution of $AV/SP$ across the | 114 | +\caption{Assessment ratios, baseline sample. Panel A: distribution of | ||
| 85 | −estimation sample; the median is 0.78 and the dashed line marks parity. | 115 | +$AV/SP$; the median is 0.78 and the dashed line marks parity. Panel B: | ||
| 86 | −Panel B: kernel of the same distribution split by the number of months | 116 | +kernel density of the same distribution split by the number of months | ||
| 87 | between the roll's market-condition reference date and the sale; older | 117 | between the roll's market-condition reference date and the sale; older | ||
| 88 | rolls sit systematically further below parity.} | 118 | rolls sit systematically further below parity.} | ||
| 89 | \label{fig:ratiodist} | 119 | \label{fig:ratiodist} | ||
@@ -92,10 +122,11 @@ rolls sit systematically further below parity.} | |||||
| 92 | \begin{figure}[t] | 122 | \begin{figure}[t] | ||
| 93 | \centering | 123 | \centering | ||
| 94 | \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig_time.png} | 124 | \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig_time.png} | ||
| 95 | −\caption{Median assessment ratio by sale month and roll vintage. Each line | 125 | +\caption{Median assessment ratio by sale month and roll vintage, baseline | ||
| 96 | −follows sales assessed under one triennial vintage (labelled by entry | 126 | +sample. Each line follows sales assessed under one triennial vintage | ||
| 97 | −year); monthly medians with fewer than 100 sales are suppressed. Vintages | 127 | +(labelled by entry year); monthly medians with fewer than 100 sales are | ||
| 98 | −enter near their reference-date market level and drift down as prices | 128 | +suppressed. Vintages enter near their reference-date market level and | ||
| 99 | −rise; the flattening after 2022 reflects the interest-rate correction.} | 129 | +drift down as prices rise; the flattening after 2022 reflects the | ||
| 130 | +interest-rate correction.} | ||||
| 100 | \label{fig:time} | 131 | \label{fig:time} | ||
| 101 | \end{figure} | 132 | \end{figure} | ||
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